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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE WARSAW CONVENTION' arose as a result of govern-
ment efforts in the 1920's to create a uniform legal regime
that would protect an infant aviation industry from catastrophic
liability in the event of an air disaster, while allowing victims
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49
U.S.C. App. 1502 (1988), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/Im/air.carriage.war-




some measure of relief.2 The Warsaw Convention was thus de-
signed to achieve two basic objectives: "to foster uniformity in
the law of international air travel"' and to limit "the liability of
air carriers in order to foster the growth of the fledgling com-
mercial aviation industry."4 Today, the Warsaw Convention has
over 130 subscribing nations, making it the most widely adhered
to private international law treaty in the world.5
Between 1925 and 1929, total airline operations in domestic
as well as global travel amounted to only 400 million passenger
miles, compared to almost 67 billion passenger miles during
1999 in the U.S. alone.6 The worldwide fatality rate was about 45
per 100 million passenger miles, compared to a fatality rate of
0.06 per 100 million passenger miles in 1998.7 The following ex-
cerpt from a well-received speech delivered by Mr. Henri de
Vos, Reporter of the Warsaw Convention, to the attending dele-
gates, captures the mood prevalent at the time of the Conven-
tion's drafting:
Here is the essential outline of the draft of the Convention,
which is submitted to you. As I said before, the time to achieve
has come. The air carriers expect us to give to them, as well as to
the insurers, the legal basis of their operation. Their carriage as-
sumes unexpected proportions everyday; in my country alone, on
one single aerodrome in the summer season, there are up to 36
departures of the regular lines by day. Aircraft go faster and
faster every day, to the point that the Fokker, the Farman, soon
are going to appear as the tools of yesteryear. We still hear the
deafening sound of the Super-Marine that just won the Schnei-
der Cup, at a speed of some 600 kilometers an hour, and, we
have before us the colossal wing span of the Do-X which, on Lake
Constance, has just demonstrated the possibility that tomorrow,
2 See generally ALEKSANDER TOBOLEWSKI, MONETARY LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY IN
AIR LAw 72-88 (1986); Paul Stephen Dempsey, Pennies from Heaven: Breaking
Through the Liability Ceilings of the Warsaw Convention, 22 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L.
267, 268 (1997).
3 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 230 (1996).
4 Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546 (1991).
5 SeeJohn F. Schutty, New Wrinkles in an Old Treaty Governing Air CarrierLiability,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 16, 1999, at 1.
6 SeeANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AvIATION LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-21 (2d ed.
1981); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE OFFICE OF AIRLINE INFORMATION, AiR STATIS-
TICS & AiRLINE FINANCIAL STATISTICS, available at www.bts.gov/oai/indicators/
top.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
7 See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 6; Air Flight Much Safer than Road Travel,
Statistics Show, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 26, 2000. The risk of being involved in
an aviation accident in which there are multiple fatalities is estimated at around
one in 3 million. Id.
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in all countries, facilities will be set up for both day and night
flights! What the engineers are doing for machines, we, lawyers,
must do the same for the law.8
The Warsaw Convention was drafted against the background
of then-current industry conditions and common practices.'
The Convention places a lot of importance on three particular
documents: the passenger ticket, the baggage check, and the air
waybill of goods.'" The Convention establishes a quid pro quo
between the aviation industry and its customers.11 Air carriers
are required to accept liability without fault for aviation disasters
and other mishaps, but only up to a limited amount, provided
that they issue and deliver to their customers' documents con-
taining certain specified items, including a notice of the limits
on liability imposed under the Convention. 12 Article 3 of the
Convention requires that:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver
a passenger ticket which shall contain the following
particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier
may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case
of necessity, and that if he exercises that right, the altera-
tion shall not have the effect of depriving the transporta-
tion of its international character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the
rules relating to liability established by this convention.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall
not affect the existence or validity of the contract of trans-
portation, which shall none the less be subject to the rules of
this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passen-
ger without a ticket having been delivered he shall not be
8 See SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAw MIN-
UTES, OCTOBER 4 - 12, 1929 WARSAW 23 (Robert C. Homer & Didier Legrez trans.,
Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1975) [hereinafter Minutes].
8 See id. at 23, 35, 40, 148-150. See aLso Tobolewski, supra note 2, at 72-88.
10 SeeJ.C. Bartra, Modernization of the Warsaw System - Montreal 1999, 65J. AIR L.
& CoM. 429, 430 (2000).
11 See Terence Sweeney, The Requirement of Notice in the Warsaw Convention, 61 J.
AIR L. & COM. 391, 393 (1996).
2 See id.
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entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this conven-
tion which exclude or limit his liability.' 3
In sum, a carrier must have delivered a passenger ticket satis-
fying certain notice requirements before it may invoke any liabil-
ity limits under the Convention against a victim of an air
disaster. In the 1920's, the term "passenger ticket" was readily
understood as a paper-based ticket containing the required no-
tices in printed or otherwise written form.' 4 As discussed below,
13 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3. In the original language, Article
3 provides:
(1) Dans le transport de voyageurs, le transporteur est tenu de delivrer un
billet de passage qui doit contenir les mentions suivantes:
(a) le lieu et a date de l'emission;
(b) les points de dipart et de destination;
(c) les arrgts prdvus, sous r~serve de la facultg pour le transporteur de
stipuler qu 'il pourra les modifier en cas de ngcessitj et sans que cette
modification puisse faire perdre au transport son caractre
international;
(d) le nom et l'adresse du ou des transporteurs;
(e) Vindication que le transport est soumis au rggime de la respon-
sabilitg 9tabli par la presente Convention.
(2) L 'absence, lirrgularitg ou la perte du billet n'affecte ni l'existence, ni
la validitg du contrat de transport, qui n'en sera pas moins soumis aux
rgles de la prisente Convention. Toutefois si le transporteur accepte le
voyageur sans qu Vl ait t dglivrg un billet de passage, il n 'aura pas le
droit de se prdvaloir des dispositions de cette Convention qui excluent ou
limitent sa responsabilitg.
Convention Pour L 'Unification de Certaines Regles Relatives au Transport Agrien Interna-
tional, Varsovie, Oct. 12, 1929, available in TRANSPORT, INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT
TREATIES 111-8 (2000).
14 A 1920's French-English dictionary translated the operative term "billet"
(i.e., ticket) as:
BILLET, by4-t, [Low Lat.: bulla, or from Eng., bill] sin. 1. Note:
short letter, billet, paper folded as a letter. Ecrire, recevoir un -, to
write, to receive a note. - doux, love letter, billet-doux. 2. bill, hand-
bill: a written or printed paper containing an announcement to the
public; 3. circular letter, circular: an announcement addressed to
certain individuals. - de naissance, de mariage, d'enterrement, circular
announcing a birth, a marriage, a funeral. - defaire part, circular
announcing some family event, as a birth, marriage or death; invita-
tion to attend a marriage or funeral. Faire courir le -, to send round
circulars. - dinvitation pour un diner, an invitation to dinner. 4.
Ticket. - d'entre, admission ticket. Prenez vos billets, take your tickets.
Montrez vos billets, take your tickets. - d'aller et retour, return ticket...
7. voting paper, ballot; 8. Certificate. - de confession, confession. -
blanc, blank paper, a blank...
A NEW FRENCH-ENGLISH AND ENGLISH-FRENCH DICTIONARY COMPOSED ON A NEW
PLAN (Garnier Freros 1st ed., 1922). Webster's Dictionary in turn defines the En-
glish word "ticket" as:
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however, today the widespread use of electronic ticketing is dis-
placing traditional paper-based tickets, and may eventually en-
tirely replace them. Nevertheless, the delivery and notice
requirements of the Warsaw Convention, as supplemented by
the 1966 MIA and Civil Aeronautic Board (CAB) regulations,
remain firmly in place. 5
This article discusses how the delivery and notice require-
ments of the Warsaw Convention can be satisfied when airline
tickets are transmitted through electronic media. It addresses
the question of how to take seriously, in the age of the Internet,
the Warsaw Convention's requirements of delivery and notice
for passenger ticketing, which were originally designed for pa-
per-based media. The article draws heavily from the analysis de-
veloped by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
the context of the electronic transmission of securities-related
documents, and applies it to a separate context, air passenger
transportation. It also seeks guidance from the recently enacted
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
("E-Sign Act"). It concludes by arguing that even in the absence
of an amendment to the Warsaw Convention taking specific ac-
count of electronic ticketing, the Warsaw Convention's notice
and delivery requirements may be satisfied by documents trans-
mitted electronically.
Part I of the article examines the phenomenon of electronic
ticketing, and its impact on both airlines and passengers. Part II
discusses the requirements of delivery and notice for passenger
ticketing as originally promulgated by the Warsaw Convention,
and as modified by related protocols, private agreements, and
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations. Part III ex-
amines the interpretation that U.S. courts have given to the
ticket... la obs. a short note or document in writing <if your - had
overtaken me. . . I had certainly returned - Richard Baker> b- a
document that serves as a certificate, license, or permit; specif: a
master's, captain's, mate's, pilot's, or airman's certificate c: a writ-
ten, typed, printed, stamped, or engraved notice, memorandum, or
token: as (1): a paper or card on an item giving information (as of
its owner, identity, maker, or price)...
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UN-
ABRIDGED 2389-90 (Merriam-Webster Inc., 3d ed., 1986).
1 See Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol, CAB Agreement 18900, note following 49 U.S.C. App.
§1502 (approved by CAB Order E-23680, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302); Ex-
emptions from Passenger Tariff-Filing Requirements in Certain Instances, 64




ticket delivery requirements of Article 3 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Particular attention will be paid to the Supreme Court's
decision in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., which specifically dis-
cusses Article 3, and to Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, where Jus-
tice Stevens in his vigorous dissent discusses the general issue of
adequate notice in passenger tickets. In Part IV, the article ex-
amines the analysis of Internet technologies developed by the
SEC and its potential applicability in the context of air transpor-
tation. In Part V, the article turns to the E-Sign Act and assesses
the potential impact of that legislation on electronic ticketing.
Finally, in Part VI, the article discusses the Montreal Convention
of 1999, successor to the Warsaw Convention, which specifically
addresses the issue of electronic ticketing but has not yet been
ratified by the U.S.
The article concludes by arguing that, even though electronic
ticketing is a development that the original drafters of the War-
saw Convention did not foresee, airlines can still comply with
the requirements of notice and delivery for passenger tickets
when they issue electronic tickets. Specific recommendations
are made as to how this can be carried out.
II. THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF
ELECTRONIC TICKETING
Internet use continues to become increasingly common
among American households. 6 Although the Internet has only
been broadly available since the late 1990's, it has already
achieved a market penetration of 60%, with over 168 million
Americans having access to the Internet. 17 The telephone did
not reach that level of penetration until thirty years after it was
developed."8 On a typical day during the second half of the year
2000, fifty-eight million people in the U.S. were connecting to
the Internet.'9 As of the second half of 2000, 73% of children
between the ages of twelve and seventeen, and 45% of all chil-
dren under the age of eighteen, were logging on.2(1
Indeed, the exploding popularity of the Internet is a global
phenomenon. About 55% of the Web traffic, that nearly 300
16 See Ernest Holsendolph, Internet Growing by Leaps and Bytes; Study Says Ameri-
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million users worldwide generate, occurs abroad. 21The Internet
already reaches 77% of Germans, 55% of Italians, and 52% of
Japanese. 22 In the Ukraine, 260 thousand people use the In-
ternet regularly, and 140 thousand do so occasionally. 23 By the
end ofJanuary 2001, there were already 22.5 million users of the
Internet in China.24 In Macao, 42% of residents have access to
the Internet.2 5 Moreover, the annual rate of growth of Internet
usage worldwide currently stands at 50%.26 In Western Europe,
the annual rate of growth is 55%.27
The Internet promises to revolutionize everyday business and
personal financial transactions, introducing unprecedented effi-
ciencies in the carriage of information. In particular, the In-
ternet is expected to have a profound impact on the distribution
of airline tickets, leading to higher profits for the airlines and
cheaper prices for consumers by eliminating entire layers of dis-
tribution. Today, 80% of airline tickets are still cleared through
the Computer Reporting System and the Airline Reporting Cor-
poration, which are used by traditional travel agents. 28
Many of the Internet airline ticket sales outlets, such as Price-
line, Travelocity, and Orbitz, have been directly funded by the
airline industry. 2" The Internet allows airlines to communicate
directly with potential customers, bypassing traditional mortar
and brick travel agencies. In 1998, less than 1% of tickets were
purchased online."' However, during the year 2000, the online
ticket outlets tallied a record-breaking $13 billion in sales, or 7-
21 See Metrics Briefs, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Feb. 12, 2001; World Net Population
Nears 300 Million, EMERGING MARKETS DATAFILE, Sept. 21, 2000.
22 See World Net Population, supra note 21.
2' See id.
24 See Adam Creed, China Now Home to Over 22.5m Internet Users - Study, NEW-
Sm-ES, Feb. 19, 2001.
25 See Macao has 130,000 Internet Users, Survey, EMERGING MARKETS DATAFILE,
XINFIUA, Feb. 26, 2001.
2 See Monitoring Media in the Former Soviet Union, EURO-EAsT, Nov. 16, 2000.
27 See id.
28 Aviation Consumer Group Calls for "Reasonable Regulation" of Airline Industry,
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 3, 2000.
29 See Delta Changes Priceline Stake to Allow Increased Investment, AVIATION DAILY,
Feb. 12, 2001, at 6; AMR to Benefit from F-Commerce, AVIATION DAILY, Dec. 8, 1999,
at 6; John Croft, Airline-Sponsored Site Scrutinized in Congress, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Feb. 12, 2001, at 18.
"o See Elaine X. Grant, Gaining Ground in the Air. (Airlines Use of the Internet for
Ticket Sales),TRAVEL AGENT, July 26, 1999, at 48.
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10% of ticket sales.3 ' By 2003, one expert estimates that between
25-30% of tickets will be purchased online. 2 As a result of the
competitive pressures posed by the Internet, commissions
charged by travel agents have eroded from an all-time high of
11.2% in 1995 to a relatively low level of 6.2% today. 3
Electronic ticketing is particularly well adapted for distribut-
ing tickets that have been purchased online.3 4 For the airlines, e-
tickets have clear advantages. Electronic ticketing improves op-
erational efficiencies and reduces costs: 5 Shipping and han-
dling costs can be eliminated, with a ticket purchased online
being automatically forwarded to the gate, where the boarding
passenger can easily pick it up.3 6 Electronic ticketing also
reduces check-in and airport personnel costs by reducing
processing coStS.3 7 The savings can be significant: it costs Ameri-
can Airlines less than 10 cents to create an e-ticket, compared to
$12 for a paper one.3 Other estimates place the cost savings at
$4 - $5 per ticket. 39 Ticket distribution costs are consistently the
biggest element of total operating costs in any year in which
there is no fuel crisis. 41' According to some analysts, by 2005 e-
tickets will save the airline industry $1 billion annually in distri-
bution costs.4
Electronic ticketing also benefits passengers. Electronic ticket-
ing eliminates passenger concerns over "carrying, forgetting, or
losing an airline ticket. ''41 2 Electronic ticketing has also been
31 SeeJohn Croft, supra note 29, at 18. Jon Swartz, Internet's Future Is Screwed on
Tight; It's No Magic Wand, but Its Still Quite a Useful, Valuable Tool, USA TODAY,
Dec. 28, 2000 at lB.
32 See Swartz, supra note 31, at lB.
'3 See id.
34 See United Airlines to Offer Industry-Leading "E-Ticket - II Interline Product ' Car-
rier to Market Fully Functional Electronic Ticketing Application Capable of Bridging Two
Different Airline Computer Reservation Systems, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 16, 2000.
-5 See Airlines Beef Up E-Tickets, Roll Out New 'Interline' Service, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS,
Oct. 30, 2000.
3"6 See United Airlines to Offer Industry-Leading 'E-Ticket-ll Interline' Product, supra
note 34.
37 See id.
38 See Ken Anderberg, E-Business, not E-Commerce, COMM. NEWS, Feb. 1, 2001, at
4.
3,) See Betsy Wade, infra note 47.
40 See Jeanniot Sees E-Ticketing Penetrating 50% of Global Market Within Five Years,
AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, Apr. 16, 2001.
41 E-Ticketing to Save Airlines US$1 BLN a YR by 2005: IATA, ASIA PULSE, May 18,
2000.
42 See United Airlines to Offer Industy-Leading 'E-Ticket-11 Interline' Product, supra
note 34.
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shown to "significantly reduce transaction times," shortening
lines at airport counters and telephone waits, thereby benefiting
both passengers and the industry. 4 Moreover, electronic ticket-
ing can now be used for international travel, allowing customers
to check-in with only their passports and the credit card used to
purchase their ticket in hand.44 According to recent surveys,
electronic ticketing is the preferred form of ticketing for over
90% of passengers who have used it.45
Indeed, the move away from paper-based tickets is both wide-
spread and unmistakable. United Airlines first introduced elec-
tronic tickets in the fall of 1994 for its West Coast United Shuttle
flights.46 Since then, e-tickets have surged in popularity, cur-
rently accounting for 60% of all tickets issued by that carrier,
and 57.1% of all tickets issued by U.S.-based carriers as a
whole. 47
The trend away from paper-based tickets is not confined to
the U.S. Over 50% of the tickets issued by Air Canada during
the year 2000 were in electronic format. 48 British Airways offers
discounts for purchases of e-tickets that reflect the lower costs
over paper tickets.49 Japan Airlines has recently expanded e-
ticket service to all of Asia and all routes between Japan and
North America."'
New improvements are also underway. The airline industry is
currently working towards establishing centralized electronic
ticketing kiosks compatible with the reservation systems of multi-
ple airlines.5 Previously, passengers traveling in more than one
airline were required to have a separate e-ticket for each air-
line.52 The new system will reduce duplicative costs at airline ter-
,3 Id.
44 See Larry Bleiberg, Passport Still Gets Stamp of Approval, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 2,
2000, at T12.
•15 United Airlines to Offer Industiy-Leading 'F-Ticket II Interline' Product, supra note
34.
46 Id.
47 See id.; Wade, supra note 39, at 26.
48 See Michael B. Davie, E-Tickets Are Getting an Excellent Reputation, TORONTO
STAR, Sept. 14, 2000.
9 See Amon Cohen, Inside Track Business Travel: 13A Changes the Fare's Fair Rule:
Airline Commission: The Best Way for Businesses to Reorganise Their Budgets After the
Introduction of Fresh Start Remains Unclear, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 3, 2001, at
14.
511 See Executive Travel in Asia this Week, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 9, 2000.





minals and further expedite booking for flights involving inter-
airline connections.53
The system is also designed to address passenger concerns
with re-accommodation to other airlines in the event of flight
cancellations and other disruptions (e.g., labor strikes). 5" The
old system did not allow for the smooth exchange of e-tickets
among airlines that existed for paper tickets. 5 Transferring to
another airline with an e-ticket could therefore result in missing
or being blocked from alternate flights, or being placed further
down in wait-lists. 56 The new system should therefore further en-
hance the popularity of e-tickets by eliminating any residual ad-
vantages of paper tickets over e-tickets from a consumer
standpoint:
1II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND RELATED
PROTOCOLS, PRIVATE AGREEMENTS, AND DOT
REGULATIONS - THE LONGSTANDING STRUGGLE FOR
A "MORE PERFECT" LIABILITY SYSTEM
A. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
Under Article 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the carrier
must deliver a "ticket" to the passenger, which must contain,
among others, "[a] statement that the transportation is subject
to the rules relating to liability established by this convention. 51 8
Under Article 3(2), the consequence of a "carrier accept[ing] a
passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered" is
that the carrier will not be "entitled to avail himself of those
provisions of th[e] convention which exclude or limit hisliability.'"159
Following a voice vote, the U.S. Senate ratified the Warsaw
Convention in 1934.6" No congressional hearings, reports, or de-
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 Charging for Paper Airline Tickets Puts Airline Needs Before Passengers, AAA Says,
PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 29, 2001, at 15. SeeJoe Sharkey, US Airways Strike Threat Shows
Drawbacks of E-Tickets, NY TIMES, Mar. 27, 2000.
56 See Charging for Paper Airline Tickets Puts Airline Needs Before Passengers, AAA
Says, supra note 55.
57 See id.
58 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3(1).
59 Id. at art. 3(2).
60 See 78 Cong. Rec. 11,582 (1934); see generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I.
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497,
502 (1967).
2002]
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bates preceded the vote."' However, a detailed record was kept
of the proceedings leading to the drafting of the Warsaw Con-
vention.62 According to Mr. Henri De Vos, Article 3 "retain[s]
only the indispensable minimum to be able to consider the car-
riage as international carriage within the meaning of the Con-
vention."'" Failure to satisfy these minimal requirements will
strip a carrier from entitlement to the Convention's liability lim-
its. "The essential thing, in this regard, is the sanction... which
consists in depriving the carrier who would carry travelers or
goods without documents or with documents not conforming to
the Convention, of the benefit of the advantages provided by
the Convention." 4
Under Article 3(2), however, before a carrier may lose the
protections available under the Warsaw Convention, the failure
to deliver the ticket must be absolute. If a carrier issues a merely
defective ticket, or if a passenger loses the ticket, the Warsaw
Convention will still apply.65
Despite this caveat, in order to avoid the Convention's liability
ceilings, plaintiffs' lawyers frequently argue a failure by the car-
rier to fulfill the requirements under Article 3." One theory
often used involves the concept of constructive non-delivery, or
the claim that a ticket was delivered in such a manner as to ne-
gate the effect of delivery.67 Another attempt involves arguing
that the Convention requires some form of minimally adequate
notice in order for the liability ceilings to apply."'
Plaintiffs' lawyers generally prefer liability to be assessed
under U.S. tort law, which provides for no liability ceilings and
has, in the past at least, offered the tantalizing prospects of puni-
tive damages as well."' The current trend among circuit level
courts in the U.S. has nonetheless been to disallow punitive
f;J See TWA, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 273 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
62 See generally Minutes, supra note 8.
6i3 1d. at 150.
-1 Id. at 20.
65 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3(2).
6; See Sweeney, supra note 11, at 393.
67 See id.
68 See id.; see e.g., Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiene, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir.
1966), afjd by equally-divided Court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968); and discussion infra; Mer-
tens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965).
69 See, e.g.,John Monk, US Airvays Fights Punitives in Crash, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 10,
1997, at Al; Steve Miletich, Alaska Contests Paying Relatives for Any Fear Suffered by
Flight 261 Victims, SEAYrLE TIMES, Nov. 7, 2000, at Al.
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damages in cases tried under the Warsaw Convention, even
where a showing of willful misconduct has been made.w°
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention caps a carrier's liability
in the event of an aviation disaster at 125,000 Franc Poincar6, or
approximately US $8,300, an amount considered low even in
1929. w' At the time, the Franc Poincar6 was the currency gold
standard in France, which the delegates chose in order to avoid
devaluation.72 Each Franc Poincar6 currency unit equaled 641/2
milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness 900. 71 Moreover, a
French court could easily convert a local currency into Francs
Poincar6, because the French franc and the Franc Poincar6 had
equivalent values in those days.74
In 1937, however, France abandoned the Franc Poincar6 as a
unit of currency. 75 In 1944, the Bretton Woods Conference al-
tered the fundamental relationship between national currencies
and gold, and created the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).76 In 1974, the IMF adopted "Special Drawing Rights," a
method of valuation based on a basket of 16 currencies, as its
official unit of exchange.77 In 1978, the IMF membership, much
of which had already abandoned the gold standard, agreed to
abolish the official price of gold, thereby letting market forces
determine the recovery available under the Warsaw Conven-
70 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983 (Korean Airlines
Disaster) 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991); In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland
on December 12, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991); Floyd v. Eastern Airlines,
872 F.2d 1462 (llth Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); see
generally Kelly Compton Grems, Punitive Damages Under the Warsaw Convention:
Revisiting the Drafters'Intent, 41 Am. U. L. REV. (1991); Ian D. Midgley, You'll Love
the Way We Fly-but if You Don't, Too Bad!: Does Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Offer
Hope of Subjecting Reckless International Airlines to Punitive Damages?, 48 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 73 (1997).
71 See LOWENFELD, supra note 6, at 7-27.
72 See LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LE-
GAL HANDBOOK 95-96 (1988).
73 See AUSTRALIA'S COMMONWEALTH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT AND REGIONAL
SERVICES, The Montreal Convention - Discussion Paper, available at http://
vw.dotrs.gov.au/aviation/mc cdiscussion-paper.htm (last visited on Aug. 30,
2002).
74 See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 72, at 95-96.
75 See GEORGETrE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 177
(1977).
76 SeeJ.C. Batra, Modernization of the Warsaw System-Montreal 1999, 65J. AIR L. &
CoM. 429, 432 (2000).
77 See IMF Chronology, at http://wvv.imf.org/external/np/exr/chron/chron.
asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
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tion.78 In 1975, the Warsaw Convention was amended to adopt
Special Drawing Rights as the treaty's measure of damages.79
However, as discussed below, the U.S. has failed to ratify most
protocols amending the Warsaw Convention's liability limits.8 0
Those limits are not mandatory. Article 22 of the Convention
allows carriers to contract with individual passengers or among
themselves for higher (but not lower) 8' liability limits.8 2 Moreo-
ver, under Article 25, a carrier will lose the protections of lim-
ited liability if a court finds it (or its agent) guilty of willful
misconduct.83 Finally, Article 41 establishes a formalized proce-
dure to call conferences to revise the Warsaw Convention. 84 Ac-
cording to Mr. Henri de Vos, Article 41 would "establish right
from today the principle that this first effort we make today is
not definitive.5 Indeed, before the original Convention had
even been signed, the French delegation made a formal request
78 See Monroe Leigh, Judicial Decision: Treaties - Warsaw Convention - Conversion
of Liability Limitations from Cold Standards to Dollars, 77 Am. J. INF'L L. 320, 320-21
(1983).
7, See MILLER, supra note 75, at 181.
8) The Hague Conference, for example, doubled the Warsaw Convention's lia-
bility limits to 250,000 Poincar6 francs, or $16,000. Although the U.S. partici-
pated in the Hague Conference, it never ratified the Hague Protocol. See Andrea
L. Buff, Reforming the Liability Provisions of the Warsaw Convention: Does the JATA
Intercarrier Agreement Eliminate the Need to Amend the Convention?, 20 FORD! LAM INT'L
L.J. 1768, 1781-1782 (1997).
81 Article 23 of the Warsaw Convention provides as follows:
Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a
lower limit than that which is laid down in this convention shall be
null and void, but the nullity of any such provision shall not involve
the nullity of the whole contract, which shall remain subject to the
provisions of this convention.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 23.
82 Id. at art. 22(1) (". . by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may
agree to a higher limit of liability.").
83 Id. at art. 25. According to article 25:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provi-
sions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if
the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such de-
fault on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to
which the case is submitted, is considered equivalent to willful
misconduct.
(2) Similarly, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
said provisions, if the damage is caused tinder the same circum-
stances by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of
his employment.
id.
8"I Id. at art. 41.
85 Minutes, supra note 8, at 32 (discussing the proposed Article 41).
2002] THE WARSAW CONVENTION 415
for future conferences to further "pursue this work of
unification."86
B. TREATIY AMENDMENTS TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION
1. The Hague Protocol
A number of conferences have been convened to "update"
the Warsaw Convention. In 1955, the Hague Protocol doubled
to 250,000 Francs Poincar45, or approximately $16,600, the War-
saw Convention's liability limits for death or injury to a passen-
ger. 7 The Hague Protocol includes a provision that allows
litigation expenses to be awarded according to local law."8 More-
over, the Hague Protocol permits plaintiffs to avoid any liability
limits by successfully establishing willful misconduct, specifically
defined as "an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or
86 Id. at 182. Specifically, the French delegation made the following request:
The conference,
Considering that the Warsaw Convention provides only for certain
difficulties relating to air carriage and that international air naviga-
tion raises many other questions that it would be desirable to pro-
vide for by international agreements,
Expresses the wish:
That, through the offices of the French Government, which has
taken the initiative of the convening of these conferences, that
there be convened subsequently, new conferences which will ptLr-
sue this work of unification.
Id.
,7 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, at art. XI [hereinafter
Hague Protocol], available at www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.carriage.warsaw.convention.
hague.protocol.1955/doc.html (last visited on Aug. 30, 2002).
88 Id. at art. XI. Article XI, which amends Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention,
states:
The limits prescribed in this article shall not prevent the court from
awarding, in accordance with its own law, in addition, the whole or
part of the court costs and of the other expenses of the litigation
incurred by the plaintiff. The foregoing provision shall not apply if
the amount of the damages awarded, excluding court costs and
other expenses of the litigation, does not exceed the sum which the
carrier has offered in writing to the plaintiff within a period of six
months from the date of the occurrence causing the damage, or
before the commencement of the action, if that is later.
Id. This provision was sponsored in large part by the U.S. delegation, in order to
secure a maximum recovery to victims and their families. See Lowenfeld & Men-
delsohn, supra note 60, at 507 (discussing liability limits).
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agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result ... ,
2. The Guatemala City Protocol
In 1971, the Guatemala City Protocol raised the Warsaw Con-
vention's liability limit for passenger death or injury to 1,500,000
Francs Poincar6, or approximately $120,000..' The Guatemala
Protocol also provides for periodic review of the liability limits,9
strict liability in case of injury or death, '2 the possibility of sup-
plemental national insurance to further protect passengers,93
and the imposition of legal fees on any carrier who fails to settle
a claim within a six-month period. 4 The Guatemala City Proto-
,, Hague Protocol, supra note 87, at art. XIII (Amending Art. 22 of the Warsaw
Convention). In the case of an act by a servant or agent of the carrier, the plain-
tiff must prove that the agent or servant was acting within the scope of his agency
or employment. See id.
90 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as
Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955, Mar. 8,
1971, art. VII, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 613, 614 [hereinafter Guatemala
Protocol].
9Id. art. XV, at 615.
92 Id. art. IV, at 613.
9Id. art. XIV, at 615. The supplemental national insurance plan must meet
the following conditions:
(a) it shall not in any circumstances impose upon the carrier, his
servants or agents, any liability in addition to that provided
under this Convention;
(b) it shall not impose upon the carrier any financial or adminis-
trative burden other than collecting in that State contributions
from passengers if required to do so;
(c) it shall not give rise to any discrimination between carriers with
regard to the passengers concerned and the benefits available
to the said passengers under the system shall be extended to
them regardless of the carrier whose services they have used;
(d) if a passenger has contributed to the system, any person suffer-
ing damage as a consequence of death or personal injury Of
such passenger shall be entitled to the benefits of the system.
Id.
1., Id. art. VIII(3), at 614. Article VIII(3) of the Guatemala Protocol provides, in
relevant part:
The costs of the action including lawyers' fees shall be awarded in
accordance with subparagraph a) only if the claimant gives a writ-
ten notice to the carrier of the amount claimed including the par-
ticulars of the calculation of that amount and the carrier does not
make, within a period of six months after his receipt of such notice,
a written offer of settlement in an amount at least equal to the corn-
pensation awarded within the applicable limit.
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col is not currently in force anywhere in the world because its
ratification clause requires adherence by the U.S. for the proto-
col to become effective. 5
3. The Montreal Protocols
Due to fluctuations in the price of gold, in 1975 a conference
was convened in Montreal to substitute the Warsaw Conven-
tion's gold standard with Special Drawing Rights. 9" The confer-
ence resulted in four protocols, only one of which the U.S. has
(recently) ratified.17 Montreal Protocol No. 1 caps carrier liabil-
ity for each passenger at 8,300 Special Drawing Rights (approxi-
mately $10,250), and 17 Special Drawing Rights for each kg of
cargo (about $21 per kg, or $9 per pound), unless a higher
value is declared in advance. ' Montreal Protocol No. 2 main-
tains the cargo liability limits of Montreal Protocol No. 1, but
provides for a higher liability limit of 16,000 Special Drawing
Rights for each passenger (approximately $20,500)Y
95 Id. art. XX(1), at 615. According to the Guatemala Protocol, thirty states
must ratify for the Protocol to become effective. Additionally:
[T]he total international scheduled air traffic, expressed in passen-
ger-kilometers, according to the statistics for the year 1970 pub-
lished by the International Civil Aviation Organization, of the
airlines ... [must equal] at least 40% of the total international
scheduled air traffic of the airlines of the member States of the
International Civil Aviation Organization in that year.
Id. The effect of this provision is to virtually require adherence by the U.S. for the
Guatemala Protocol to come into effect. The purpose of this provision was to
prevent the emergence of two parallel systems of liability should only a limited
number of countries ratify the Protocol, similar to what happened during the
early years of the Hague Protocol of 1955.
See STUART M. SP EISrR & CHARLES F. KRAUSE, AvIATION TORT L\w § 11:20, at
681 n. 35 (1978) (discussing the Guatemala Protocol ratification process).
96 See Batra, supra note 76, at 432.
'7 See id.
9.1 Additional Protocol No. . to Amend Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 Octo-
ber 1929, Signed at Montreal 25 September 1975, art. II, available at http://www.
jus.uio.no/hn/air.carriage.warsaw.conven tion.mon treal.protocol. 1.1 975/doc.
html (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
99 Additional Protocol No. 2 to Amend Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsawon 12 Octo-
ber 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955,
Signed at Montreal, 25 September 1975, art. II, available at http://www.jus.uio.
no/lm/air.carriage.warsaw.convention.mon treal.protocol.2.1975/doc.html (last
visited Aug. 30, 2002). Over 40 countries have ratified Montreal Protocols No.1
and No.2, both of which came into force in 1997 with respect to their signatories.
See Carl W. Christy, Jr., Changes in International Air Caigo: Montreal Protocol No. 4
Attains Force of Law, 5 ILSAJ. INr'L & Co,%ip. L. 531, 539 (1999).
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Montreal Protocol No. 3 raises the liability limits even further,
providing for "the sum of 100,000 Special Drawing Rights [ap-
proximately US$140,000] for the aggregate of the claims, how-
ever founded, in respect of damage suffered, as a result of the
death or personal injury of each passenger."')"1 Montreal Proto-
col No. 3 also incorporates by reference all the provisions of
both the Hague and Guatemala City Protocols.1 1 Montreal Pro-
tocol No. 3 languished before the U.S. Senate, but was ulti-
mately not ratified, primarily due to the Senate's preference for
unlimited air-carrier liability." 2
The U.S. has generally been reluctant to adopt any revisions
of the Warsaw Convention."'I However, on September 28, 1998,
the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to Montreal Protocol
No. 4,1)4 which incorporates by reference the Hague Protocol of
100 Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 Octo-
ber 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955
and at Guatemala City on 8 March 1971, Signed at Montreal, on 25 September
1975, art. II, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.carriage.warsaw.conven-
tion.montreal.protocol.3.1975/doc.html (last visited on Aug. 30, 2002). Montreal
Protocol No. 3 also provides for ceilings of 4,150 Special Drawing Rights for lia-
bility incurred as a result of delays in the carriage of persons. Additionally, the
liability for the loss or destruction of baggage is capped at 1,000 Special Drawing
Rights. 1d. at art. II.
I'l Id. at art. V.
1( 2 See Nicolas Mateesco Matte, The Warsaw System and the Hesitations of the U.S.
Senate, 8 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 151, 159-60 (1983) (describing Senate opposition
to the Protocol's liability limits as the determinative factors in the Senate's failure
to ratify). For example, during the Senate debate, Senator Ernest F. Hollings
stated that:
In 1980, the Air Law Committee of the International Law Associa-
tion recommended unlimited liability for personal injuries or death
to individual passengers. This Air Law Committee consists of 38 dis-
tinguished international scholars, many of whom have been instru-
mental in the development of the Warsaw Convention and its
progeny of treaties... When a group such as this puts its support
behind the proposition that airlines in international aviation
should be subject to unlimited liability, one would be hard-pressed
to justify a treaty to the contrary.
129 CONG. REC. 4130 (1983).
13 See Schutty, supra note 5, at 1.
104 Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 Octo-
ber 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955,
Signed at Montreal on 25 September 1975, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/
lm/air.carriage.warsaw.convention.montreal.protocol.4.1975/doc.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 4]; see also John F.
Schutty, supra note 5, at 1; 144 CONG. REC. § 11,059-2 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
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1955.1 5 Montreal Protocol No. 4 is an amendment to the War-
saw Convention that modernizes rules applicable to interna-
tional air cargo. 10 6 Over 45 countries have adopted Montreal
Protocol No. 4.1" By the time the U.S. finally adopted the
Hague Protocol of 1955, over 100 countries, including the ma-
jority of European countries, were long-standing signatories.""
a. Montreal Protocol No. 4 & Electronic Air Waybills
No revision to the Warsaw Convention has addressed the issue
of electronic ticketing. However, Montreal Protocol No. 4 specif-
ically addresses the issue of electronic air waybills for interna-
tional air cargo.' 019 Montreal Protocol No. 4 allows for the
1998) (Statement of Presiding Officer). On November 5, 1998, the President
signed the instrument of ratification for Montreal Protocol No. 4, which entered
into force in the U.S. on March 4, 1999. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng,
525 U.S. 155, 175 n.14 (1999).
105 See Schutty, supra note 5 at 1. In relevant part, Montreal Protocol No. 4
provides:
"Ratification of this Protocol by any State which is not a Party to the Warsaw
Convention ... as amended at the Hague, 1955, shall have the effect of accession
to the Warsaw Convention as amended at the Hague, . . . and by Protocol No. 4 of
Montreal, 1975."
Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 104, art. XVII (emphasis added).
106 See generally Christy, supra note 99.
107 These include: Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ku-
wait, Morocco, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Qatar,
Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Macedonia, Togo,
Turkey, United Kingdom, and Venezuela. See Schutty, supra note 5, at n. 19.
,08 See Buff, supra note 80, at 1782.
lo Art. III of Montreal Protocol No. 4 replaces Section III of the Warsaw Con-
vention with a new section, entitled "Documentation Relating to Cargo." Mon-
treal Protocol No. 4, supra note 104, at art. III. It amends Art. 5 of the old section
with the following:
(1) In respect to the carriage of cargo an air waybill shall be
delivered.
(2) Any other means which would preserve a record of the carriage to
be performed may, with the consent of the consignor, be substi-
tuted for the delivery of an air waybill. If such other means are
used, the carrier shall, if so requested by the consignor, deliver
to the consignor a receipt for the cargo permitting identifica-
tion of the consignment and access to the information con-
tained in the record preserved by such other means.
(3) The impossibility of using, at points of transit and destination,
the other means which would preserve the record of the car-
riage referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article does not entitle
the carrier to refuse to accept the cargo for carriage.
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replacement of paper documentation for international air cargo
with electronic documentation, thus reducing processing times
for import/export transactions.'"' Montreal Protocol No. 4 per-
mits the air carrier and his customer, upon mutual agreement,
to issue for all stages of shipment an electronic air waybill in-
stead of the traditional paper document.'''
Under Article 5 of the original Warsaw Convention, the air
carrier has the right to demand that its customer make out and
hand over an air waybill.'' I Under Article 8, that air waybill must
contain a lengthy list of particular items, including a notice that
the liability limits under the Warsaw Convention shall apply." 13
Under Article 9, an air carrier cannot invoke any liability protec-
Id. (emphasis added).
1 See id.; Prepared Statement of Alan P. Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Eco-
nomic and Business Affairs before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FED. NEWS
SERVICE, May 13, 1998.
1 Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 104, art. III.
112 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 5.
11- Id. at art. 8. The original article 8 required all of the following items to be
included in an air waybill:
(a) the place and date of its execution;
(b) the place of departure and of destination;
(c) the agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may
reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of neces-
sity, and that if he exercises that right the alteration shall not
have the effect of depriving the carriage of its international
character;
(d) the name and address of the consignor;
(e) the name and address of the first carrier;
(f) the name and address of the consignee, if the case so requires;
(g) the nature of the goods;
(h) the number of the packages, the method of packing and the
particular marks or numbers upon them;
(i) the weight, the quantity and the volume or dimensions of the
goods;
(j) the apparent condition of the goods and of the packing;
(k) the freight, if it has been agreed upon, the date and the place
of payment, and the person who is to pay it;
(1) if the goods are sent for payment on delivery, the price of the
goods, and, if the case so requires, the amount of the expenses
incurred;
(in) the amount of the value declared in accordance with Article
22(2);
(n) the number of parts of the air consignment note;
(o) the document handed to the carrier to accompany the air
consignment note;
(p) the time fixed for the completion of the carriage and a brief
note of the route to be followed, if these matters have been
agreed upon;
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tions for lost or damaged cargo unless he has in his possession
an air waybill that complies with the requirements of Article 8. ,4
Montreal Protocol No. 4, however, significantly reduces the
information that must be provided under Article 8.15 The elec-
tronic air waybill must only contain information identifying the
cargo, the place of departure and destination, and an express
permission by the shipper to its customer granting access to the
electronic air waybill. l
Moreover, Montreal Protocol No. 4 entirely omits from the
amended version of Article 9 the loss of liability penalty for non-
conformity with Article 8."11 The effect of this change should be
to reduce or altogether eliminate litigation over incomplete air
waybills. 8
(q) a statement that the carriage is subject to the rules relating to
liability established by this Convention.
1I. The Hague Protocol shortened this 17-item list to only 3 items. Hague Proto-
col, supra note 87, art. VI; Christy, supra note 99, at 534-35.
114 Article 9 of the original Warsaw Convention provides that:
If the carrier accepts goods without an air consignment note having
been made out, or if the air consignment note does not contain all
the particulars set out in Article 8 (a) to (i) inclusive and (q), the
carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
Convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 9.
115 1966 MIA, infra note 144, at art. III. Refer infra for the amended article 8 in
full.
"1 Art. III of Montreal Protocol No. 4 replaces Art. 8 of the old section III of
the Warsaw Convention with the following:
The air waybill and the receipt of the cargo shall contain:
(a) an indication of the places of departure and destination;
(b) if the places of departure and destination are within the terri-
tory of a single High Contracting Party, one or more agreed
stopping places being within the territory of another State, an
indication of at least one such stopping place; and
(c) an indication of the weight of the consignment.
Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 104, art. III.
117 Compare the previous article 9 of the Warsaw Convention, described in
note 114, supra, with the new amended version under Montreal Protocol No.4:
"Non-compliance with the provisions of Articles 5 to 8 shall not affect the exis-
tence or the validity of the contract of carriage, which shall, none the less, be
subject to the rules of this Convention including those relating to limitation of
liability." Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 104, at art. III.
118 See Christy, supra note 99, at 535; see e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp.,
247 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001) (shipping company not entitled to limit its liability
for damaged shipment after failing to complete an air waybill as required under
the Hague Protocol); Intercargo Ins. Co. v. China Airlines, Ltd., 208 F.3d 64 (2d
Cir. 2000) (failure to list stopping places in an air waybill prevents recourse to the
limits of liability under the Warsaw Convention); Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y. v.
Delta Air Lines, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8652 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (a reasonable person
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Unfortunately, Montreal Protocol No. 4 dates back to 1975,
when Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and other electronic
information technologies, now routinely used in the import/ex-
port business, were in their infancy.'"' ' Not surprisingly, Mon-
treal Protocol No. 4 leaves a lot of important issues unsettled.
For example, Montreal Protocol No. 4 requires an air waybill
to be divided into three parts. '2" The consignor must sign the
first part, which is marked "for the carrier."' 2' The consignor
and the carrier must sign the second part, which is marked "for
the consignee."'12 The carrier must sign the third part and de-
liver it to the consignor once the cargo has been accepted. 23
Montreal Protocol No. 4 provides that the signature of the car-
rier and that of the consignor may be printed or stamped. 24
However, it makes no provision for signatures that are in elec-
tronic format. 12' This failure is particularly problematic in the
context of the recent, rapid emergence of electronic signatures,
which use strong encryption technologies to guarantee authen-
ticity, and which, as discussed below, are specifically granted full
legal effect (i.e., on par with handwritten signatures) under U.S.
federal law. 126
In traditional paper-based commerce, formalities pertaining
to manually written documents, signatures, or notices give shape
could not be certain that JFK was the actual place of execution of an air waybill
that did not specify a place of execution. Therefore, defendant could not invoke
the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention over a missing bag of currency);
Brink's Ltd. v. South African Airways, 93 F.3d 1022, 1033-34 (2d Cir. 1996) (fail-
ure to complete an air waybill prevents a carrier from invoking the Warsaw Con-
vention's liability limits); Tai Ping Ins. Co. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 94 F.3d 29,
33-34 (2d Cir. 1996) (plaintiff entitled to full recovery over the value of missing
cargo, because air waybill did not fully describe the "agreed stopping places").
1 See PeterJones, The US Ratifies Montreal Protocol No. 4: A Commentary on this
Important Protocol Dealing with the Air Carriage of Goods under the Warsaw Convention,
FORWARDERLAW.COM, Oct. 23, 1998, at http://www.forwarderlaw.com/archive/
fiatfe23.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).





125 SeeJones, supra note 119.
126 15 USC §7001 (2001); Maureen Sirhal, Businesses, Consumers Tout Benefits of
E-Signatures, NAT'LJ. Trcich. DAILY, Apr. 3, 2001; Tatiana Helenius, Digital Signa-
tures to Send 7ransactions Skyrocketing, the Impact of the Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act on Financial Services, WALL ST. & TECH., Oct. 1, 2000, at
11; See generally Adam White Scoville, Clear Signatures, Obscure Signs, 17 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 403 (1999).
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to the contours of a commercial contract, providing evidence of
its true dimensions before a court of law. 127 In the absence of
such proof, a party's legal remedies may be substantially im-
paired. It is not clear under Montreal Protocol No. 4 whether an
electronic air waybill should be treated in all respects as the le-
gal equivalent of a paper air waybil11 z
In particular, Article 11 (1) of the original Warsaw Convention
states that " [t] he air consignment note is prima facie evidence of
the conclusion of the contract, of the receipt of the goods and
of the conditions of carriage."' 29 Although Montreal Protocol
No. 4 amends air waybill delivery requirements under Article 5
of the Warsaw Convention, it does not amend Article 11(1).
Moreover, the amended Article 5 does not redefine the term
"air waybill" to explicitly include electronic documents. 3 ' In-
stead, it states that "any other means" (i.e., electronic means)
will henceforth be deemed as an acceptable substitute for affect-
ing "the delivery of an air waybill." '' The impact of the
amended Article 5 on Article 11 (1) is therefore unclear.
The Montreal Convention of 1999 addresses this ambiguity.:13 2
Article 4 of the Montreal Convention of 1999 echoes Article 5 of
the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Montreal Protocol
No. 4:
Any other means which preserves a record of the carriage to be
performed may be substituted for the delivery of an air waybill. If
such other means are used, the carrier shall, if so requested by
the consignor, deliver to the consignor a cargo receipt permit-
ting identification of the consignment and access to the informa-
tion contained in the record preserved by such other means.'
However, unlike the Montreal Protocol No. 4, the Montreal
Convention of 1999 provides for an amended Article 11(1):
"The air waybill or the cargo receipt is prima facie evidence of the
127 Judith Y. Gliniecki and Ceda G. Ogada, The Legal Acceptance of Electronic Doc-
uments, Writings, Signatures, and Notices in International Transportation Conventions:
A Challenge in the Age of Global Electronic Commerce, 13J. INT'L L. & Bus. 117, 120
(1992).
128 SeeJones, supra note 119.
129 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(1).
130 Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 104, art. III.
131 Id.
132 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, May 28, 1999, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/
seldoc/1999/4713.html (last visited April 16, 2002) [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
133 Id. at art. 4.
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conclusion of the contract, of the acceptance of the cargo and
of the conditions of carriage mentioned therein."'34
In other words, the Montreal Convention of 1999 expressly
recognizes the documentary value of a cargo receipt that pro-
vides access to information contained in electronic format, but
that itself does not contain such information. On the other
hand, absent an "intermediary" cargo receipt, the Montreal
Convention of 1999 does not recognize the documentary value
of electronic documents.
As further discussed below, the U.S has not yet ratified the
Montreal Convention of 1999, which also addresses electronic
passenger tickets.
C. PRIVATE AGREEMENTS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
MODIFYING THE WARSAW CONVENTION
1. The Montreal Intercarrier Agreement of 1966
Criticism of the liability limits provided under the Warsaw
Convention and related protocols has continued unabated at
least since the time of the Hague Conference. By 1955, the air-
line industry was well-established and financially stable, with sig-
nificantly improved safety records over earlier periods.'3 5
Accordingly, it became increasingly felt that the liability limits
provided an undeserved benefit to the airlines industry at the
expense of passengers.' 3 6
Dissatisfaction with the liability limits came to a head on No-
vember 15, 1965, when the U.S. gave notice of its intention to
withdraw from the Warsaw Convention unless it was amended to
raise them. 137 The U.S. emphasized, however, that the sole rea-
son for the denunciation was that the liability limits were too
low.' 8 In a press release, the Department of State announced
134 Id. at art. 11 (emphasis added).
135 See David I. Sheinfeld, Comment, From Warsaw to Tenerife: A Chronological
Analysis of the Liability Limitations Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 45 J.
AIR L. & COM. 653, 660-61 (1980) (describing the conditions of the airline indus-
try at the time of the Hague Conference).
136 See Brian S. Tatum, Exclusivity of the Warsaw Convention's Cause of Action: The
U.S. Supreme Court Removes Some of the Expansive Views Foundations in Zicherman v.
Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMi'. L. 537, 541-42 (1997).
'37 Dep't of State Release No. 268 (Nov. 15, 1965), reprinted in 53 DEPT. STATE
BULL. 923-24 (Dec. 6, 1965). See Mankiewicz, From Warsaw to Montreal with Certain
Intermediate Stops: Marginal Notes on the Warsaw System, 14 AIR L. 239, 253-54 (dis-
cussing the impact of denunciation).
,38 See CAB Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
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that the U.S. would reconsider withdrawing its denunciation if
the Convention's liability limits were temporarily raised to
US$75,000 per passenger, followed by a subsequent increase to
US$100,000.
139
The effect of a withdrawal by the U.S. from the Warsaw Con-
vention would have been disastrous to the airlines from a liabil-
ity perspective. A denunciation would have subjected the
airlines to uncertainties as to the applicable law, and to recourse
by plaintiffs to unlimited liability and even punitive damages. 140
As discussed above, Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention ex-
pressly allows carriers to resort to private agreements that in-
crease existing liability limits.14 ' Article 22 avoids the logistical
difficulties posed by a formal amendment to the Warsaw Con-
vention under Article 41, which in this case would have had to
be duly ratified within the six months before the U.S. denuncia-
tion came into effect. 142 Accordingly, in advance of May 15,
1966, intense negotiations were conducted on behalf of the U.S.
government, all U.S. air carriers, and most major foreign carri-
ers represented by the International Air Transport Association
(IATA). 143 One day before the effective date of the U.S. denun-
ciation, these parties signed the 1966 Montreal Intercarrier
Agreement (1966 MIA).' 44
139 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 60, at 551 (discussing the U.S.
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention). Under Article 39 of the Warsaw Con-
vention, a notice of denunciation does not become immediately effective. Had
the U.S. not withdrawn its denunciation, it would only have become effective on
May 15, 1966, or 6 months after November 15, 1965, the date of filing with the
Polish government. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 39.
140 See Kelly Compton Grems, Comment, Punitive Damages under the Warsaw
Convention: Revisiting the Drafters' Intent, 41 AM. U. L. REV.141, 152 (1991); W.
KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS 257-62 (5th ed. 1984) (ex-
plaining the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which applies when no direct evidence
to show cause of injury exists, but circumstantial evidence makes defendant's neg-
ligence the most plausible explanation). Res ipsa loquitur does not create a pre-
sumption of liability, but a permissible inference, which the jury is free to accept
or reject. 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW §2.09[6] (1991).
I'l See also H. L. Silets, Something Special in the Air and on the Ground: The Potential
for Unlimited Liability of International Air Carriersfor Terrorist Attacks under the Warsaw
Convention and its Revisions, 53J. AIR L. & Com. 321, 341 (1987).
142 SeeJonathan L. Neville, The International Air Transportation Association's At-
tempt to Modify International Air Disaster Liability: An Admirable Effort with an Impossi-
ble Goal, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 571, 575 (1999).
4 13 See id.; see also 1966 MIA, infra note 144.
1-44 See Order of Civil Aeronautics Board Approving Increases in Liability Limi-
tations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, Order E-23680, 31
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Under the 1966 MIA, the carriers agreed to increase the liabil-
ity limits for passenger injury or death to $75,000 including legal
fees (or $58,000 exclusive of legal fees, where awards are so sep-
arated). 145 Moreover, the carriers waive the Warsaw Conven-
tion's Article 20(1) due care defense, which reads: "The carrier
is not liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossi-
ble for him or them to take such measures." 4 ' As a result, the
1966 MIA has the effect of establishing absolute liability for avia-
tion disasters. 147
For our purposes, however, the crucial aspect of the 1966 MIA
is that it clarified the Warsaw Convention's passenger ticket no-
tice and delivery requirements. Under the 1966 MIA, the air car-
riers agreed "at the time of the delivery of the ticket" to furnish
each passenger engaged in international travel a notice, as de-
scribed verbatim in the Agreement, advising the passenger that
the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations, as modified by the
Agreement, will apply. 148 This notice should be "printed in type
Fed. Reg. 7302, reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C. §40,105 at 1147-48 (1994)
[hereinafter 1966 MIA].
145 See id.
141 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 20(1). The "due care" defense
permitted air carriers to invoke as a defense the proven fact that they took all
necessary steps to avoid the accident and the ensuing damages. See M. Veronica
Pastor, Absolute Liability Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention; Where Does It
Stop?, 26 G.W. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 575, 577 (1993) (arguing that the 1966 MIA, by
abandoning the "due care" defense benefited both air carriers by continuing
their liability limitations, and passengers, by relieving them from the burden of
overcoming the due care defense and requiring them to only show damages). See
also 1966 MIA, supra note 115; Loryn B. Zerner, Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines and
Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention: A Cloud Left Uncharted, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1245, 1256 (1999).
147 See O'Rourke v. Eastern Airlines, 553 F. Supp. 226, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
The author uses the term "absolute liability" in contrast to "strict liability" as the
latter generally allows for defenses such as war or act of God, while the former
allows for no defenses (with the possible exception of the "defense" of contribu-
tory negligence).
148 Specifically, the 1966 MIA provides in relevant part that:
2. Each carrier shall, at the time of delivery of the ticket, furnish
to each passenger whose transportation is governed by the Conven-
tion ... the following notice, which shall be printed in type at least
as large as 10 point and in ink contrasting with the stock on (i)
each ticket; (ii) a piece of paper either placed in the ticket envel-
ope with the ticket or attached to the ticket; or (iii) on the ticket
envelope:
ADVICE TO INTERNATIONAL PASSENGER ON LIMITATION
OF LIABILITY
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at least as large as 10-point" modern type. 149
The U.S. Supreme Court has described the 1966 MIA as a pri-
vate agreement among carriers, which, by itself, provides for no
sanctions for breach. 5 ° In particular, in the event of a breach,
not even a carrier that has signed the 1966 MIA will lose entitle-
ment to the Warsaw Convention's liability limits.15' For a time,
some courts suggested that the 1966 MIA should be read in con-
junction with Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention to provide for
such a sanction. 5 2 However, in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, as dis-
cussed below, the Supreme Court put any speculation of that
sort to rest.15 It is certainly arguable nonetheless that the 10-
point modern type requirement was a major quid pro quo for
Passengers on a journey involving an ultimate destination or a
stop in a country other than the country of origin are advised that
the provisions of a treaty known as the Warsaw Convention may be
applicable to the entire journey, including any portion entirely
within the country of origin or destination. For such passengers on
a journey to, from, or with an agreed stopping place in the United
States of America, the Convention and special contracts of carriage
embodied in applicable tariffs provide that the liability of certain
(name the carrier) and certain other [*] carriers parties to such
special contracts for death of or personal injury to passengers is
limited in most cases to proven damages not to exceed US $ 75,000
per passenger, and that this liability up to such limit shall not de-
pend on negligence on the part of the carrier. For such passengers
traveling by a carrier not a party to such special contracts or on a
journey not to, from, or having an agreed stopping place in the
United States of America, liability of the carrier for death or per-
sonal injury to passengers is limited in most cases to approximately
US $ 8,290 or US $ 16,580.
The names of Carriers parties to such special contracts are availa-
ble at all ticket offices of such carriers and may be examined on
request.
Additional protection can usually be obtained by purchasing in-
surance from a private company. Such insurance is not affected by
any limitation of the carrier's liability under the Warsaw Conven-
tion or such special contracts of carriage. For further information
please consult your airline or insurance company representative.
[*] Either alternative may be used.
1966 MIA, supra note 115.
149 Id.
15o See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122, 125 (1989).
151 See id. at 126.
152 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana, on July 9,
1982, 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986); In reAir Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland,
on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983).
153" 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
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the U.S. withdrawal of its notice of denunciation from the War-
saw Convention.
2. The 1966 MIA & the DOT Regulations
Although the U.S. Congress was not required to ratify the
1966 MIA, executive branch regulations incorporate the agree-
ment into U.S. law.' 54 The 1966 MIA was initially enforced by
the Civil Aeronautic Board and is now by the DOT.1 55 Air carri-
ers that refuse to abide by the 1966 MIA can lose their license to
operate international flights to and from the U.S. 56
49 U.S.C. §41504 requires every U.S. and foreign carrier, "in
the way prescribed by regulation by the Secretary of Transporta-
tion," to file, publish and keep open for public inspection tariffs
showing all prices for "foreign air transportation" between
points served by that carrier. 1 7 Moreover, "[t]he Secretary may
reject a tariff or tariff change that is not consistent with this sec-
tion and regulations prescribed by the Secretary."' 15
In 14 CFR §221, the Secretary has established the detailed
tariff-filing rules and authority for approvals, rejections, and
waivers, including provisions for information that must be in-
cluded in a tariff,5 9 such as "a description of the classifications,
rules, and practices related to the foreign air transportation ...
[or] other information .... "'"' As a condition for filing a tariff
with the DOT, the Secretary has determined that carriers oper-
ating international flights must abide by the provisions of the
1966 MIA. 6'
154 See Exemptions From Passenger Tariff-Filing Requirements in Certain In-
stances, supra note 15, at 40,654, 40,655.
155 See 1966 MIA, supra note 115.
156 See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122, 150-51 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
,57 49 U.S.C.S. § 41504(a) (2001).
158 Id. § 41504(c).
159 14 C.F.R. Pt. 221 (2001).
1W 41 U.S.C. § 41504(a)(1) (2001).
ifii See Exemptions From Passenger Tariff-Filing Requirements in Certain In-
stances, supra note 15, at 40,654, 40,655. Specifically, 14 C.F.R. § 221.105 (2001),
entitled, "Special notice of limited liability for death or injury under the Warsaw
Convention," provides:
(a) (1) In addition to the other requirements of this subpart, each
air carrier and foreign air carrier which, to any extent, avails
itself of the limitation on liability to passengers provided by
the Warsaw Convention, shall, at the time of delivery of the
ticket, furnish to each passenger whose transportation is
governed by the Convention and whose place of departure
2002] THE WARSAW CONVENTION
In particular, the regulations provide that an air carrier must
provide passengers with a notice of the limitations of liability
under the 1966 MIA. 6 2 This notice must be "printed in type at
least as large as 10-point modern type and in ink contrasting
with the stock" appearing on "[e]ach ticket," or a "piece of pa-
per either placed in the ticket envelope with the ticket or at-
tached to the ticket," or "[t]he ticket envelope." '63 In other
words, the regulations are drafted using restrictive language ex-
plicitly applicable to traditional paper-based ticketing.
3. The Japanese Initiative and the European Regulations
On their own initiative and for various reasons, the airlines
have increasingly sought to liberalize their rights to limitation
under the Warsaw Convention by way of private agreements. As
the airlines move towards an unlimited liability framework, the
relevance of the issue of adequate notice may seem to fade away.
However, the airline industry is yet to voluntarily subject itself to
or place of destination is in the United States, the following
statement in writing:
Advice to International Passengers on Limitations of
Liability
Passengers embarking upon a journey involving an ulti-
mate destination or a stop in a country other than the coun-
try of departure are advised that the provisions of a treaty
known as the Warsaw Convention may be applicable to their
entire journey including the portion entirely within the
countries of departure and destination. The Convention
governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers to
passengers for death or personal injury to approximately $
10,000.
Additional protection can usually be obtained by purchas-
ing insurance from a private company. Such insurance is
not affected by any limitation of the carrier's liability under
the Warsaw Convention. For further information please
consult your airline or insurance company representative.
(2) Provided, however, that when the carrier elects to agree to a
higher limit of liability to passengers than that provided in Article
22(1) of the Warsaw Convention, such statement shall be modified
to reflect the higher limit. The statement prescribed herein shall be
printed in type at least as large as 10-point modern type and in ink
contrasting with the stock on:
(i) Each ticket;
(ii) A piece of paper either placed in the ticket envelope with the
ticket or attached to the ticket; or
(iii) The ticket envelope.
14 C.F.R. § 221.105 (2001) (emphasis added).
16;2 See id.
163 Id.
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the full breadth of the U.S. tort system. In particular, as dis-
cussed below, no intercarrier agreement provides for punitive
damages. Of course, this restriction may not be so significant to
residents of states that do not allow for punitive damages.
In November 1992, the Japanese airlines, in the wake of the
crash of a Japan Air Lines B747 on a domestic flight, broke
ranks with other airlines and wholly abandoned all limits on lia-
bility, in what has been labeled "the Japanese initiative."'64 The
families of the 529 passengers who died in that crash received
compensation far in excess of that prescribed under the Warsaw
Convention.'1 5 It seemed illogical that passengers on a domestic
flight would receive adequate compensation in the event of an
air disaster, but not those traveling on a generally more expen-
sive international flight.'"'
For the first 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (approximately
$140,000) worth of damages incurred from any aviation disaster,
whether during a domestic or international flight, the Japanese
airlines therefore agreed to hold themselves absolutely liable.'" 7
For damages exceeding that amount and up to an unlimited
amount, however, the Japanese carriers would retain the "all
reasonable measures" defense available under Article 20 of the
Warsaw Convention."'
In late 1995, the European Union (EU) began to adopt the
Japanese initiative's two-tiered liability approach." 9 EU carriers
were to be required to have adequate insurance, and to make
advance payments to passengers or their relatives within 15 days
of an air disaster.'7" These proposals were formalized in October
9, 1997, with the promulgation of European Council Regulation
No. 2027/97, which applies to both intranational and interna-
tional travel.' 7' This regulation is currently being amended to
bring it into conformity with the Montreal Convention of 1999,
discussed below. 172
'64 Australia's Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Ser-




171 Commission Regulation 2027/97, 1997 OJ. (L 285).
172 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil Amending Regulation (EC) No. 2027/97 on Air Carrier Liability in the Event
of Accidents, Document 500PC0340, 2000/0193 (CNS), available at http://eu-
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4. The JATA Intercarrier Agreements
Both IATA and the U.S. Air Transport Association (ATA)
were moving in the direction of the Japanese initiative. In partic-
ular, invoking Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention to raise
the convention's liability limits by private agreement, IATA
adopted a series of intercarrier agreements that greatly expand
carrier liability. '73 On October 30, 1995, the regional delegates
at IATA's Annual Meeting in Kuala Lampur unanimously
adopted an Intercarrier Agreement (IA) that, while rejecting
the two-tiered liability framework under the Japanese initiative,
significantly enhanced passenger rights in the event of an air
disaster. 174
In particular, the carriers agreed:
To take action to waive the limitation of liability on recover-
able compensatory damages in Articles 22, paragraph 1 of the
Warsaw Convention as to claims for death, wounding or other
bodily injury of a passenger within the meaning of Article 17 of
the Convention, so that recoverable compensatory damages may
be determined and awarded by reference to the law of the domi-
cile of the passenger.
To reserve all available defenses pursuant to the provision of
the Convention; nevertheless, any carrier may waive any defense,
including the waiver of any defense up to a specified monetary
amount of recoverable compensatory damages, as circumstances
warrant. 175
Accordingly, each passenger was to be allowed recovery for
compensatory damages to the extent allowed by the law of his
domicile. Moreover, under the IA each carrier had the option,
but was not required, to implement the Japanese two-tier "un-
limited" and "absolute-up-to-a-certain-point" liability framework.
In 1996, IATA adopted the Agreement on Measures to Imple-
ment the IATA Intercarrier Agreement (MIA). 176 This second
agreement further expanded passenger rights in the event of an
air disaster. Under Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention, a
ropa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexapi! prod! CELEXnumdoc&lg=
EN&numdoc=31997R2027&model=guichett (last visited April 16, 2002).
173 See generally, James N. Fincher, Watching Liability Limits Under the Warsaw Con-
vention Fly Away, and the IATA Iniative, 10 TRANSNAT'L L. 309 (1997).
174 See Federico Ortino & Gideon R.E. Jurgens, infra note 180, at 379.
175 IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, opened for signature
Oct. 21 1995, available at 21 AIR & SPACE L. 24 (1996).
176 IATA Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agree-
ment, opened for signature May 1966, reprinted in 21 AIR & SPACE L. 90 (1996).
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carrier may avoid liability if it can show that all necessary mea-
sures were taken to prevent the resulting harm.'77 However, the
MIA specifies that no carrier shall invoke any defense under Ar-
ticle 20(1) for any claim up to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights
(approximately $140,000).178 At the option of the carrier, that
amount may be raised or lowered for some routes if this is con-
sistent with national regulations.' y Moreover, also at the option
of the carrier, recovery may be had under the laws of the domi-
cile of the passenger, but only for "compensatory damages." In
other words, punitive or exemplary damages are disallowed.' 80
In 1997 the U.S. ATA, in turn, reached an agreement for the
Intercarrier Agreement to be Included in Conditions of Car-
riage and Tariff (IPA), which directs how the IA and the MIA
will be implemented by U.S. carriers, for transportation any-
where in the world.' 8' Under the IPA, the carrier is denied the
option, otherwise available under the Hague Protocol, to as-
sume absolute liability for amounts of less than 100,000 Special
Drawing Rights for specific routes, if consistent with national
regulations. 2
177 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 20 ("The carrier is not liable if
he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures.").
178 In Section I of the MIA, the carriers incorporate the following into their
tariffs and conditions of carriage:
(CARRIER) shall not invoke the limitation of liability in Article
22(1) of the Convention as to any claim for recoverable compensa-
tory damages arising under Article 17 of the Convention.
(CARRIER) shall not avail itself of any defense under Article
20(1) of the Convention with respect to that portion of such claim
which does not exceed 100,000 SDRs [unless option 11(2) is used,
which allows carriers to lower this amount for specific routes, if
consistent with national regulations].
Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof,
(CARRIER) reserves all defenses available under the Convention to
any such claim. With respect to third parties, the carrier also
reserves all rights against any other person, including, without limi-
tation, rights of contribution and indemnity.
id.
79 See id.
181) See Federico Ortino & Gideon R.E. Jurgens, The IATA Agreements and the
European Regulation: The Latest Attempts in the Pursuit of a Fair and Uniform Liability
Regime for International Air Transportation, 64J. AIR L. & CoM. 377, 397 (1999).
I'l See United States Department of Transportation, Order 96-11-6 (Nov. 12,
1996), available at http://dms.dlot.gov/general/orders/19964qtr/961106.pdf
(last visited April 16, 2002).
182 See id.
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On January 8, 1997, the DOT approved the IIA, MIA, and
IPA.18 The approval, however, was conditioned on the carriers'
continuing participation in the 1966 MIA.184 It is not clear why
the MIA 1966 continues to be necessary, given the broadened
liability to which air carriers have now volunteered to subject
themselves. Nonetheless, the 1966 MIA remains firmly in place
in the U.S.'
IV. THE VIEWS OF U.S. COURTS ON THE WARSAW
CONVENTION'S NOTICE AND DELIVERY REQUIREMENTS
U.S. courts have grappled with the issue of giving substance to
the Warsaw Convention's notice and delivery requirements. As
discussed above, Article 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention contains
a list of particulars that must be included in the passenger ticket
that must be delivered to a passenger as a condition, imposed by
Article 3(2), for the liability limits under Article 22 to apply. 8 ;
Article 3(2) also states that irregularities in a passenger ticket
will not affect the validity of the contract of transportation,
which shall continue to be subject to the rules of the Warsaw
Convention. 87 The tension, then, is between a total failure to
deliver a passenger ticket, and the delivery of a ticket that is
merely "irregular." U.S. courts have struggled to draw a dividing
line between these two extremes.
A. THE "FLYING TIGER LINE" CASES
At one end of the spectrum, for example, are the facts in War-
ren v. Flying Tiger Line.' In that case, on March 1962, a plane
carrying military personnel disappeared en route from Travis
Air Force Base, California to Vietnam.' 8" At the foot of the
boarding ramp, the passengers had each been given by a Flying
Tiger Line stewardess a document denominated a "boarding
ticket," and required to board immediately.'"
The boarding tickets did not contain all the information re-
quired under Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention. The boarding




186 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3.
187 See id.
188 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
181, Id. at 495.
qo Id. at 496-97.
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the rules relating to liability established by the Convention... if
such transportation is 'international transportation' as defined
by said Convention."'' However, the notice was printed in such
a fine type that the court found that a magnifying glass was liter-
ally required to read it.'19 2 Moreover, the boarding tickets con-
tained neither the name of the passengers to whom they were
issued, nor the "agreed" stopping places en route to destina-
tion.' 93" Finally, the court found that the passengers could have
purchased in the airport supplementary insurance had they not
been told to board immediately after receiving their tickets. '
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the notice and delivery re-
quirements of the Warsaw Convention had not been satisfied. 95
In particular, the Court inferred from Article 3(2) an implied
requirement that delivery of a passenger ticket be made suffi-
ciently in advance to permit the passenger to purchase addi-
tional insurance should he so desire.19 6
This was the same result previously reached by the Second
Circuit, under similar facts, in Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.'97
That case involved a wrongful death claim arising from an air
crash that occurred during a routine journey between San Fran-
cisco, California, and Tachikawa Air Force Base, Tokyo, Ja-
pan."8 Lieutenant Mertens, who perished in the flight, had only
been delivered a ticket after he boarded the plane, when the
plane was already loaded and ready for take-off.'19
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ticket had
not been delivered to Lieutenant Mertens in such a manner as
to allow him to take self-protective measures against the liability
limits imposed by the Warsaw Convention. Accordingly, the
ticket had not been "delivered" under the terms of Article 3(2)
of the Warsaw Convention, and the liability limits therefore did
not apply. The Court explained:
The delivery requirement of Article 3(2) would make little sense
if delivering the ticket to the passenger when the aircraft was sev-
eral thousand feet in the air could satisfy it. The specific lan-
,, Id. at 497.
2 Id.
193 Id.
194 352 F.2d at 498.
19,5 See id.
9(1 See id.
19 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965).
',, Id. at 853.
',,' Id. at 857.
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guage of Article 3(2), making the limitation of liability
unavailable 'if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger
ticket having been delivered' lends support to our position. 200
B. Lisi v. ALITALIA-LINEE AEREE ITALIENE
Aside from the time of delivery of the passenger ticket, U.S.
courts have considered the question of the type size used in the
notice that must be printed on the ticket pursuant to Article
3(1) of the Warsaw Convention. However, to this day, U.S.
courts have not provided a clear dividing line between the type
size that violates the Convention, and the type size that does not.
At one end of the spectrum is Chan v. Korean Air Lines, discussed
below, where the Supreme Court found that a notice printed in
size 8 type was acceptable. At the other end of the spectrum is
Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane,2 ° 1 where the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that 4-point type did not. And, of course
there is still paragraph (a) (2) of the DOT's 14 CFR §221.105,
requiring "type at least as large as 10 point.1
'2 112
Lisi involved claims arising from an airplane crash in Shan-
non, Ireland on February 26, 1960 during a flight from Rome to
New York. 2 '3 Alitalia had provided each passenger a ticket and a
baggage claim stub that included the notices required by the
Warsaw Convention, "but in exceedingly small print.
20 4
The Warsaw Convention does not mention type size. How-
ever, the Court rejected a literal reading of the Warsaw Conven-
205Th Coation. The Court described as arbitrary the Convention's
limitations on the carrier's liability, and noted that they had
been severely criticized. 2 6 The Court held that the one-sided
advantages that the limitations of liability provide the carrier
come at the cost of a quid pro quo.2° v In particular, the carrier
must deliver a ticket and a baggage claim stub that clearly state
that the Convention severely limits the recovery otherwise availa-
200 Id. (emphasis added).
201 370 F2.d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), affd by equally divided Court, 390 U.S. 455
(1968).
202 Exemptions From Passenger Tariff-Filing Requirements in Certain Instances, supra
note 15.
203 Lisi, 370 F.2d at 510.
204 Id. at 513.
205 See id.
206 See id. at 512-13.
207 Id.
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ble to the passenger and his family in the event of an
accident. 2 8
The Court characterized the Warsaw Convention notice that
had been printed on the ticket using 4-point type as "camou-
flaged in Lilliputian print in a thicket of 'Conditions of Con-
tract'" and as "virtually invisible. . . ineffectively positioned,
diminutively sized, and unemphasized by bold face type, con-
trasting color, or anything else. '2 19 Accordingly, the Court held
that (he delivery of the passenger ticket had been so inadequate
as to be an absolute failure, and that Alitalia therefore could not
invoke the Convention's liability limits. 211'
C. CH1AN v. KOREAN AIR LINES
A problem that plaintiffs' lawyers frequently confront when
invoking theories of constructive non-delivery involves the lack
of guidance in Article 3 as to what constitutes effective notice
and delivery for Warsaw Convention purposes. The 1966 MIA,
by contrast, provides specific instructions for the manner in
which notice must be performed. In particular, as discussed
above, 10-point modern type in contrasting stock must be used.
Moreover, the 1966 MIA also sets forth in verbatim the language
that the notice must contain. However, the 1966 MIA does not
provide for sanctions in the event of a failure by a carrier to
abide by its terms. Although the DOT enforces the 1966 MIA, it
has never tried to persuade the courts to waive the liability limits
under the Warsaw Convention in the event of a carrier's
breach.''
Some courts had speculated that the Warsaw Convention and
the 1966 MIA could be read in conjunction. The 1966 MIA
would provide the specific instructions as to how notice should
be carried out that are absent in the Warsaw Convention, while
the Warsaw Convention would provide the sanctions for non-
compliance with these instructions that are absent in the 1966
MIA. This approach was followed by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland1 2 and the
208M See id. at 512.
209 Id. at 514.
211) See id.
211 Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122, 150-51 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
2 2 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Air Crash Disaster near New
Orleans, Louisiana.2t3
However, in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that this approach was incorrect.214 The 1966 MIA was
never merged into the Warsaw Convention.2 15 Rather, the two
documents coexist side by side, and must be treated as legally
independent.2 1,
Chan arose from wrongful death claims against Korean Air
Lines arising from the destruction by a Soviet military aircraft of
an off-course Boeing 747 en route from Kennedy Airport in New
York to Seoul, South Korea.217 The passengers had been given
tickets that contained the notice required by the Warsaw Con-
vention, but in 8-point type instead of the 10-point type required
by the 1966 MIA and specific DOT regulations.2 1 8 Plaintiffs con-
ceded that the Warsaw Convention does not by itself require no-
tice to be provided using 10-point type.21 ' However, they
claimed that this requirement was created under the 1966 MIA,
and that the Warsaw Convention's liability limits should there-
fore not apply.220
1. Justice Scalia's Restrictive Reading of the Relationship Between
Articles 3(1) and 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected plaintiffs' con-
tention. The notice that had been printed using the allegedly
inappropriate type size is, as discussed above, one of the items
required by Article 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention. According
to Justice Scalia, nothing in either Article 3(1) or 3(2) states that
Article 3(1) provides the standard against which to assess non-
delivery under Article 3(2).221 Only if a court finds that the pas-
senger ticket has not been delivered under the terms of Article
3(2) will a carrier lose the protection of the Warsaw Conven-
tion's liability limits.2 2 2 Failure to include in a passenger ticket
213 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986).
214 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
215 See id. at 151 (Brennan, J., concurring).
216 See id.
217 See id. at 123 (Scalia, J., majority opinion).
2M See id. at 124. The author knows of no reason why the DOT took no en-
forcement action to require carriers, such as Alitalia and KAL, to publish their
notices in 10-point type.
219 See id. at 125-126.
220 Chan, 490 U.S. at 125-126.
221 See id. at 125.
222 See id. at 128.
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any of the items listed in Article 3(1), however, is not necessarily
equivalent to non-delivery under Article 3(2).23
Justice Scalia further rejected plaintiffs' contention that the
failure to explicitly link articles 3(1) and 3(2) by way of mutual
references had been a drafting error.224 Moreover, the fact that
the corresponding provisions in the Warsaw Convention for bag-
gage claim stubs were linked - in that failure to meet the require-
ments of the first entails a loss of the liability limits according to
the second - did not resolve the issue.22 5 According to Justice
Scalia, the result that the text produces as it is written is not
necessarily absurd, and estimations of what the drafters may
have had in mind are speculation. 22 6 "We must thus be governed
by the text - solemnly adopted by the governments of many sep-
arate nations - whatever conclusions may be drawn from the
intricate drafting history that petitioners and the United States
have brought to our attention. 2 2 7
As discussed above, the U.S. is now party to the Hague Proto-
col. The Hague Protocol wholly replaces Article 3(1) of the War-
saw Convention with a new provision that significantly reduces
the items that must be listed on a passenger ticket. Specifically,
Article 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention, as amended by the
Hague Protocol, provides:
1. In respect of the carriage of passengers a ticket shall be deliv-
ered containing:
(a) an indication of the places of departure and destination;
(b) if the places of departure and destination are within the
territory of a single High Contracting Party, one or more
agreed stopping places being within the territory of an-
other State, an indication of at least one such stopping
place;
(c) a notice to the effect that, if the passenger's journey in-
volves an ultimate destination or stop in a country other
than the country of departure, the Warsaw Convention
may be applicable and that the Convention governs and
in most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or
personal injury and in respect of loss of or damage to
baggage.22
223 See id. at 128-29.
22-1 See id. at 134.
225 See id.
226 Chan, 490 U.S. at 134.
227 Id.
228 Hague Protocol, supra note 87, at Art. III.
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The Hague Protocol also redrafts Article 3(2) to make explicit
the linkage between the amended Article 3(1) and the loss of
liability penalty provision under Article 3(2). The amended Arti-
cle 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention now reads:
2. The passenger ticket shall constitute prima facie evidence of
the conclusion and conditions of the contract of carriage.
The absence, irregularity or loss of the passenger ticket does
not affect the existence or validity of the contract of carriage
which shall, none the less, be subject to the rules of this Con-
vention. Nevertheless, if, with the consent of the carrier, the
passenger embarks without a passenger ticket having been
delivered, or if the ticket does not include the notice re-
quired by paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the carrier shall not
be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of Article 22.9
In other words, a failure to deliver a notice of the limits of
liability under the Warsaw Convention, but not any other in-
stance of nonconformity with Article 3(1), will result in the loss
of the liability limits for the carrier. By making the linkage be-
tween Article 3(1) and Article 3(2) explicit, the Hague Protocol
renders the main thrust of Justice Scalia's analysis in Chan
largely irrelevant.
2. Justice Brennan's Analysis
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, took issue with
the majority's interpretation of the Warsaw Convention and its
"misplaced literalism and disregard of context. '23 ° Justice Bren-
nan offered a reading of the text that does not "disregard the
wealth of evidence to be found in the Convention's drafting his-
tory on the intent of the governments that drafted the
document. 231
ForJustice Brennan, a reading of the Warsaw Convention that
entirely decouples Article 3(1) from Article 3(2) would be incor-
rect, because it would allow carriers to benefit from having
failed to conform to the requirements of Article 3(1).232 Justice
Brennan points out that the penalties set forth in Article 3(2)
were intended to protect passengers, not carriers. The drafting
history "was absolutely clear" that the carrier was to lose the limit
of liability should the passenger ticket not include the particu-
229 Id.
230 See Chan, 490 U.S. at 138, n. 5 (Brennan, . concurring).
2391 Id. at 136.
232 See id. at 141.
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lars listed in Article 3(1).2" Moreover, "if notice is indeed re-
quired, it must surely meet some minimal standard of
'adequacy.' "234
The crucial question, then, was whether the 8-point type in
the Korean Air Lines passenger ticket provided adequate no-
tice.2 35 Justice Brennan concluded that it did, and distinguished
this type size from the four-point size used in the passenger
ticket in Lisi.2 36 However, Justice Brennan did not develop hard
and fast rules against which to measure adequacy of notice
under the Warsaw Convention. In particular, he did not address
the adequacy of type of intermediate sizes between 4-point and
8-point.
However, unlike the majority opinion, Justice Brennan's con-
currence explicitly addresses the relationship between the War-
saw Convention and the 1966 MIA. Justice Brennan rejected the
contention that the 1966 MIA provides the standard against
which to measure adequacy of notice under the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Because the 1966 MIA, unlike the Warsaw Convention, is
not a formal treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate, it can have no
impact on a court's interpretation of the Warsaw Convention or
its specific terms. Justice Brennan explained -
The Montreal Agreement is a private agreement among airline
companies, which cannot and does not purport to amend the
Warsaw Convention. To be sure, the Agreement was concluded
under pressure from the United States Government, which
would otherwise have withdrawn from the Warsaw Convention.
But neither the Montreal Agreement nor the federal regulations
purport to provide notice according to the Agreement's specifi-
cations with loss of the Warsaw Convention's limits on liability.
The sanction, rather, can only be whatever penalty is available to
the FAA against foreign airlines that fail to abide by the applica-
ble regulations, presumably including suspension or revocation
of the airline's permit to operate in the United States.23 7
D. CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, INC. V. SHUTE
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify its position
on passenger notice in transportation tickets in Carnival Cruise
233 See id. at 143.
2 '4 Id. at 150.
235 Chan, 490 U.S. at 152.
236 See id. at 149-152.
237 Id. at 151.
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Lines, Inc. v. Shute.2 "8 Although Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, passed up that opportunity, the dissent by Justice Mar-
shall and Justice Stevens addressed the issue forthrightly.
239
Carnival Cruise Lines involved a fine-print forum-selection
clause in "the 8th of the 25 numbered paragraphs" on the face
(lower-left hand corner) of a nonrefundable ticket for a 7-day
cruise voyage. 24 The Shutes, residents of Washington State, pur-
chased through a travel agent in that state a ticket from Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc., whose headquarters are in Miami, Fl., for a
round-trip voyage from Los Angeles, CA, to Puerto Vallarta,
Mexico.241 When the ship was in international waters, Eulala
Shute injured herself.24 2 Upon their return to Washington State,
the couple filed suit in a local federal district court. Because the
forum-selection clause required lawsuits to be filed in Florida,
the case was dismissed by the district court.243
The Supreme Court, after examining the legal history of fo-
rum-selection clauses, upheld the dismissal.244 However, Justice
Blackmun expressly declined to address the issue of adequate
notice, because the plaintiffs had "essentially conceded that they
had notice. 245
Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall, however, emphasized
that not even the most meticulous passenger was likely to have
noticed the forum-selection clause.24" Moreover, a passenger
would have had the initial opportunity to notice the forum-se-
lection clause only after already having purchased the ticket,
which was nonrefundable. 247 Accordingly, it could not be fairly
said that the notice of the forum-selection clause would give the
passenger an opportunity to prepare himself, either by refusing
to purchase the ticket or taking other remedial action.248 This
reasoning, comparable to that developed by the courts in the
Flying Tiger Line cases, led Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall to
238 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
239 See generally Sweeney, supra note 11, at 422-24.
240 Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 587.
241 See id. at 588.
214 2 See id.
2,43 See id.
244 See id. at 590-597.
245 Id. at 590. (Stevens & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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conclude that the forum-selection clause should have been
deemed null and void. 249
V. THE SEC'S POSITION ON ELECTRONIC NOTICE AND
DELIVERY OF DOCUMENTS
A. THE DOT & TICKETLESS TRAVEL
The DOT has recognized that electronic ticketing is a dy-
namic and evolving element in the marketing of air transporta-
tion that entails substantial cost efficiencies.25 ° Moreover, it has
stated that it will not take action against carriers that fail to im-
mediately deliver in printed format with each electronic ticket
the notices required by the Department's regulations:
We have decided as a matter of compliance policy not to pur-
sue remedial or punitive action if air carriers give, or make read-
ily available, to electronically ticketed passengers the written
notices required by the existing DOT ticket-notice rules no later
than the time that the passengers appear at the airport for the
first flight in their itinerary. We believe that this approach
strikes the most reasonable balance at this time between ensur-
ing that important information reaches consumers before they
travel without inhibiting the development of electronic ticketing
and imposing additional costs that might stifle industry innova-
tions and result in higher prices for consumers. It also puts all
carriers on the same footing with respect to ticketless notices; as
a result of past DOT requests, many airlines currently mail or
fax consumer notices to ticketless customers at the time of
purchase, but some carriers do not.251
The Department's position offers carriers that distribute tick-
ets electronically considerable freedom from regulatory interfer-
ence. Unfortunately, the DOT has offered scant guidance as to
how the notice and delivery requirements may be satisfied for
civil liability purposes when tickets are transmitted electroni-
cally. Under Supreme Court precedent, offering passengers a
notice of liability limits at the airport prior to boarding may not
be sufficient to protect carriers in the event of an international
air transportation disaster. The format in which the notices
should be presented to passengers is also unclear.
24,) See id.





B. ELECTRONIC NOTICE AND DELIVERY OF DOCUMENTS & THE
SECURITIES LAWS
Although the DOT offers scant guidance, some government
agencies have closely examined the impact of electronic docu-
ments in other fields of law. The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), for example, has paid considerable attention to
the issue.
Indeed, the concepts of notice and delivery are a fundamental
aspect of the securities laws. Congress passed the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 to address the widespread
fraud and unsavory practices that culminated with the market
crash of 1929.52 The legislation created a regulatory framework
to ensure full disclosure to the investing public of all material
information for securities offerings, as well as for securities listed
for trade on a national security exchange.253 Under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, a company intending to raise capital through
security offerings must, absent an exemption, register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by filing a registra-
tion statement.25 4 The registration statement must contain all
relevant information about the company that an investor would
need to know to adequately evaluate the securities offering.255
The Securities Act of 1933 also requires that simultaneously
with, or prior to, any public offering, the issuer must deliver a
prospectus (which is included in the registration statement filed
with the SEC) to potential investors. 256 This requirement is de-
signed to provide investors with all the necessary information to
properly evaluate an offering before making an investment
decision.257
Since the inception of the securities laws, the required disclo-
sures have been performed through prospectuses and other tra-
252 15 U.S.C. §77a-77aa (2001); 15 U.S.C. §78a-7811 (2001); See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976); see also Norwood P. Beveridge, Is Mens
Rea Required for a Criminal Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, 52 Bus. L. 35, 40-43
(1996) (tracing the legislative history of the Securities Act); Kenneth L. Denos,
Blue and Gray Skies: The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 Makes the
Case for Uniforinity in State Securities Law, 1997 Ui-Ai L. REV. 101, 104-106 (1997)
(discussing the Securities Act).
253 See Jonas A. Marson, Surfing the Web for Capital: The Regulation of Internet Se-
curities Offerings, 16 COMPUTER & Hic, -i TECH. L.J. 281, 282 (2000).
254 See 15 U.S.C.A. §77e(a), (c) (2001).
255 See 15 U.S.C.A. §7 7 g, aa (2001).
256 See 15 U.S.C.A. §77e(b) (2001).
257 See Marson, supra note 253, at 282.
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ditionally paper-based documents. 25 However, in a 1995 no-
action letter to Brown & Wood, the SEC staff expanded the defi-
nition of a statutory prospectus to include not only documents
printed on paper, but those in electronic format as well. 259 As a
result, a company for the first time was allowed to offer its pro-
spectus online, thus satisfying the notice and delivery require-
ments of the securities laws through the Internet. 60 Since then,
the Internet has had a profound impact on all aspects of the
security business,26 ' and the SEC has published a number of re-
leases and enforcement actions that provide a refined guidance
on the use of electronic media by issuers of all types, including
intermediaries. 62 According to the SEC, the use of electronic
media to transmit required disclosures should be "at least an
equal alternative to the use of paper-based media. '263 Although
the SEC explicitly encourages electronic distribution meth-
ods,4 it imposes strict protections that preserve important
rights.265
1. Verification of Delivery
The SEC approach to electronic document delivery is based
on three fundamental principles: notice of delivery, access, and
verification of delivery.2  A document delivered electronically
should be delivered in such a manner that its intended recipient
'258 See id.
259 See Brown & Wood, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 281, at
1 (Feb. 17, 1995).
260 See id.
261 See Marson, supra note 253, at 281.
'2 2 See Use of Electronic Media, Release Nos. 33-7856, 34-47728, IC-24426, 17
CFR Pts. 231, 241 and 271, 2000 SEC Lexis 847 (April 28, 2000) [hereinafter
April 2000 Release]; Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Release No.
33-7234, 34-36346, IC-21400, 17 CFR 230, 232, 239, 240, and 270, 60 FR 53468
(Oct. 6, 1995); Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Interpretative Re-
lease No. 33-7233; 34-36345; IC-21399 (Oct. 6, 1995), available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-7233.txt [hereinafter October Interpretative Re-
lease]. Use of Electronic Media by Broker-Dealers, Transfer Agents, and Invest-
ment Advisers for Delivery of Information, part VI, Exchange Act Release No. 33-
7288, 61 FR 24644 (May 15, 1996); Securities Act Release No. 7516, 63 FR 14806
(Mar. 23, 1998); Securities Act Release No. 7759, Section II.G, 64 FR 61382 (Oct.
22, 1999).
263 October Interpretative Release, supra note 262, at 6.
264 See id. at 8 ("An issuer or other party that structures its [electronic] delivery
in accordance with the principles and examples set forth below can be assured
that it is satisfying its delivery obligations under the federal securities laws.").
265 See generally Marson, supra note 253.
266 See October Interpretative Release, supra note 262.
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is aware of its delivery, at least to the same extent as if the docu-
ment had been delivered by postal mail.267 Delivery of a docu-
ment by e-mail would generally satisfy the SEC's notice of
delivery requirement.268 However, posting the document on a
website, without separate notice, would generally not satisfy the
requirement.269 In the context of electronic ticketing, this would
mean, for example, that an online travel agent would not be
allowed to satisfy the Warsaw Convention's notice requirement
merely by posting a generalized notice on his website for any
potential customer to read. At the very least, the online travel
agent would have to e-mail, along with the electronic ticket, or
embedded in the electronic ticket, a hyperlink 2710 to the genera-
lized notice available at the travel agent's website.
a. Hyperlinks
However, the use of hyperlinks presents its own set of theoret-
ical difficulties. A hyperlink that is used as a text locator within a
single document is not problematic from a legal perspective, be-
cause it can be analogized to a table of contents.27' However,
according to the SEC, electronic documents that are hyper
linked to one another may be treated as a single document.27 2
Accordingly, hyperlinks to external documents entail pitfalls for
issuers that internal hyperlinks do not. An issuer that provides
an external hyperlink (e.g., to a website run by an investment
advisor service) may be held accountable for the contents of a
website that it does not control.273
From the standpoint of convenience of document presenta-
tion, however, the SEC's treatment of hyperlinks has clear ad-
vantages.274 For example, the securities laws require that sales
literature, whether in paper or electronic form, be preceded or
267 See id. at 8.
268 See id.
26 See id.
270 A hyperlink is an electronic address embedded in a document that links to
another place in the same document or to another document altogether. Typi-
cally, you click on the hyperlink to activate the electronic address. Hyperlink is
the most essential component of hypertext systems (a special type of database
system that allows for creative linkage to disparate items) such as the World Wide
Web. See http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/h/hyperlink.html (last visited
Aug. 30, 2002).
271 See April 2000 Release, supra note 262, at 88-89.
272 October Interpretative Release, supra note 262, at 15.
273 Id. at 16. See also April 2000 Release, supra note 262, at 32-35.
274 See Marson, supra note 251, at 293-94.
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accompanied by a final prospectus. 275 In the case of electronic
sales literature that contains a hyperlink to the final prospectus,
the SEC will invoke the "envelope theory," and treat the final
prospectus as if it had been delivered in a single package with
the sales literature. 276 Likewise, under the "envelope theory," an
electronic ticket would be deemed to contain the notice re-
quired by the Warsaw Convention even though the ticket deliv-
ered only includes a hyperlink to the relevant material.
2. Access
a. The "Digital Divide"
The second fundamental principle of the SEC's approach to
notice and delivery for electronic documents, access, may not be
readily satisfied through simple tinkering with the format in
which electronic documents are presented. The SEC expects
documents delivered electronically to be just as accessible to
their intended recipients as if they had been delivered by postal
mail. 27 7 At the same time, it has expressed concern about the
differential access to Internet-connected computers across geo-
graphical, socioeconomic and ethnic groups, or the so-called
"digital divide. 278
275 October Interpretative Release, supra note 262, at 15.
2711 See id. See also April 2000 Release, supra note 262, at n. 41. ("When an issuer
includes a hyperlink within a document required to be filed or delivered under
the federal securities laws, we believe it is appropriate for the issuer to assume
responsibility for the hyperlinked information as if it were part of the document.
We believe that the inclusion of a hyperlink to an external website or document
demonstrates the hyperlinking party's intent to make the information part of its
communication with investors, security holders and the markets. Additionally, be-
cause written offers must be made exclusively through a Section 10 prospectus,
when an issuer includes a hyperlink to an external web site or document within a
Section 10 prospectus, the issuer expresses its concern to have the hyperlinked
information treated as part of this exclusive means of offering its securities.").
277 See id. at 8.
278 See April 2000 Release, supra note 262, at 67. ("We believe that the time for
an 'access-equals-delivery' model has not arrived yet. Internet access is more prev-
alent today than it was in 1995, but many people in this country still do not enjoy
the benefits of ready access to electronic media."). The problem of the "digital
divide" was repeatedly highlighted during the Clinton administration. See Kevin
Sack, Gore Denounces Gap in Access to Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2000, at 18. For
example, a 1999 Commerce Department study found that households with in-
comes of $75,000 and higher were 20 times as likely than those at the lowest
income to have access to the Internet, and 9 times as likely to own a computer.
See id. Among households with earnings between $15,000 and $35,000, more than
32% of white households had computers, compared to 19% of black households.
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Accordingly, the SEC has indicated that it does not yet em-
brace "electronic-only offerings. ' v2 7 " The SEC has not wholly
abandoned the paper-based method of delivery of prospectuses,
and in fact requires that that method be retained in all cases. 2""
In other words, issuers that offer electronic documents for distri-
bution must also offer them in an alternative, paper-based for-
mat.2 2 Moreover, charging additional printing or mailing and
handling fees may not restrict access to the paper-based docu-
ments in any fashion, such as.28 2
b. The SEC's "Burdensomeness" Standard
There is another side to the digital divide, however. Some
users who do have access to Internet-connected computers may
not have access to the specific software and computer hardware
necessary to process documents in the format selected by the
issuer.2 -3 Therefore, according to the SEC, "the use of a particu-
lar medium should not be so burdensome that intended recipi-
ents cannot effectively access the information provided. 2 84
c. Technological Considerations
The SEC's "burdensomeness" standard has two aspects. The
first aspect relates entirely to technological considerations.8 5
Unless specifically informed otherwise, the issuer may not pre-
sume that the recipient has access to top-of-the-line Internet
computing technologies. 28 6 For example, an issuer who delivers
documents in formats that require specialized computer
processing should supply the recipient with all necessary
software and technical assistance to process the document, be-
forehand and at no cost. 2 8 7 In certain cases, the recipient may
possess the technology necessary to process the electronic docu-
ment, but the processing itself may be onerous. 28 ' For example,
See id. For all income levels, 17% of white households had Internet access at
home, compared to only 8% of black or Hispanic households. See id.




283 See October Interpretative Release, supra note 262, at 10, n. 29.
284 Id. at 8.
285 See id. at 9. See also April 2000 Release, supra note 262, at 21-22.
286 See id.
287 See id.
288 See id.at 10, n. 29.
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downloading the document may be time-consuming. 8 In that
case, absent prior consent by the recipient, the delivery require-
ment is not satisfied.290
ii. Ease of Presentation
The second aspect of the SEC's "burdensomeness" standard
involves ease of presentation. In other words, disclosures that
are legally mandated must be presented in a format that puts
them at the recipient's fingertips and does not require any sort
of heavy maneuvering on his part. As an example, the SEC sug-
gests that:
[I]f an investor must proceed through a confusing series of ever-
changing menus to access a required document so that it is not
reasonable to expect that access would generally occur, this pro-
cedure would likely be viewed as unduly burdensome. In that
case, delivery would be deemed not to have occurred unless de-
livery otherwise could be shown.29'
Ease of presentation is of particular importance with respect
to the proper use of hyperlinks. Hyperlinks to required informa-
tion should always be prominently displayed, and the informa-
tion to which they connect should be instantaneously
accessible.2 ' The hyperlinks should therefore not be placed
among a clutter of unrelated information, or otherwise ob-
scured. They should be positioned so that the recipient can
readily locate them. Moreover, recipients should not be re-
quired to "dig" past multiple "inner" web pages to access the
relevant hyperlink.
d. Method of Presentation
In the context of electronic ticketing, method of presentation
requirement is particularly important. As discussed above, the
1966 MIA sets forth very particularized requirements for the
manner in which the Warsaw Convention's limit of liability no-
tice must be presented. The purpose is to prevent presentation
methods (i.e., use of small type size) that obscure the notice.
The SEC has specifically sought to preserve for electronic doc-
uments form-of-presentation requirements that were originally
28 See id.
290 See October Interpretative Release, supra note 262, at 10, n. 29.
291 Id. at 9, n. 24.
292 See, e.g., id. at 16, ex. 16.
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designed for paper-based media.2 3 Like the 1966 MIA, the regu-
lations promulgated by the SEC contain in numerous instances
detailed instructions as to the appropriate presentation of
printed documents. 294 The SEC has sought to retain the sub-
stance of those requirements by issuing regulatory amendments
that apply to documents delivered by electronic media. For ex-
ample, 17 CFR §230.420 provides:
Where a prospectus is distributed through an electronic me-
dium, issuers may satisfy legibility requirements applicable to
printed documents, such as paper size, type size and font, bold-
face type, italics and red ink, by presenting all required informa-
tion in a format readily communicated to investors, and where
indicated, in a manner reasonably calculated to draw attention
to specific information.295
In the context of electronic ticketing the critical problem is to
identify those electronic-format "bells and whistles" that are
equivalent to the 1966 MIA's 10-point size type and "contrasting
stock" requirements. The 10-point size type requirement can be
quite literally satisfied by using type larger than 10 point
throughout the electronic document. Because larger type size
will not generally occupy increased computer memory, and be-
cause, by way of hyperlinks, available presentation space is virtu-
ally unlimited, as a general rule electronic tickets should use
throughout type size larger than 10 point. Perhaps the hyperlink
connecting to the Warsaw Convention notice should use even
larger type, to guarantee that it is not obscured. The "contrast-
ing stock" requirement could also be quite readily satisfied, by
using type that contrasts with the website's background color, or
by even using type of a color that contrasts with any other color
in the website, including that used elsewhere for type.
3. Verification of Delivery
The third fundamental principle of the SEC's approach to
electronic documents involves verification of delivery, which is
in large part satisfied through informed consent. 96 To satisfy
the informed consent standard, the issuer must apprise the re-
293 See October Interpretative Release, supra note 262, at 14-30 (containing a
number of amendments to existing regulations).
294 See id.
295 17 C.F.R. § 230.420 (2002).
296 See October Interpretative Release, supra note 262, at 10.
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cipient of all possible disadvantages of receiving documents in
electronic format. 297 According to the SEC:
If consent is used, the consent should be an informed con-
sent. Recipients generally should be apprised: that information
provided would be available through a specific electronic me-
dium or source (e.g., via a web site); of the potential that inves-
tors may incur costs (e.g., on-line time); and of the period
during, and the documents for, which the consent will be effec-
tive. For instance, investors should be made aware of whether
the consent extends to more than one type of document. If an
investor revokes a consent that extends to more than one docu-
ment, and the provider of the information to ensure effective
delivery or transmission is relying upon consent, future docu-
ments should be delivered in paper unless the provider of the
information has an alternative mechanism for ensuring effective
electronic delivery. If not, it would appear likely that continued
electronic delivery, after revocation of consent, would not be
considered to result in the investor's having access to the infor-
mation and, therefore, the delivery requirement would not be
satisfied.2t) 8
The SEC allows an issuer to request that recipients provide
"global consent," or consent that relates to all documents to be
delivered by that particular issuer during a given period.21 How-
ever, as stated by the SEC above, informed consent must gener-
ally be technology-specific. The recipient may consent to
electronic delivery in certain formats, but not in others. In large
part, this reflects concerns by the SEC regarding access and
technical compatibility between the issuer's and the recipient's
computer systems.")
Moreover, the issuer cannot coerce consent from the recipi-
ent by requiring that consent be granted as a condition of doing
business. :" 1 In fact, the consent, which must be freely given, may
equally be freely revoked.3 °2 In the case of a revocation, all docu-
ments should henceforth be delivered in paper-based format.,03
• ,7 See id. at 10 n.29.
298 Jd.
299 See April 2000 Release, supra note 262, at 15-20.
.oo See id. at 19 (stating that an investor should not be "disadvantaged by inad-
vertently consenting to electronic delivery through a medium that is not compati-
ble with the investor's computer hardware and software").
110, Id. at 17-18.
302. Id. at 19.
.103 See October Interpretative Release, supra note 262, at 9 (stating that, "as a
matter of policy, where a person has a right to receive a document under the
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Moreover, the recipient, whether he has revoked consent or
not, should have access in paper-based format to all documents
that have ever been delivered electronically." 4
At first blush, it would seem that a passenger who purchases
an electronic ticket online implicitly consents to the electronic
delivery of the Warsaw Convention's notice of liability limits.
However, the SEC has rejected the notion of implied consent: °5
The recipient must always explicitly provide consent.30 6 Consent
cannot be inferred from a recipient's proven access to the tech-
nologies necessary for effective delivery of the electronic
documents." 7
For example, a passenger who purchases an electronic ticket
online cannot be presumed by the carrier to have consented to
electronic delivery of the Warsaw Convention's notice of the lia-
bility limits. Instead, a dialog box or other comparable mecha-
nism should be used to specifically request consent for
electronic delivery of the notice. Nonetheless, the fact that,
upon request, the passenger has provided an e-mail address, may
serve as an affirmative expression of consent to the electronic
delivery of documents, although the SEC has cautioned that the
agency is not yet ready to explicitly say so.
08
There are other forms of verifying delivery of electronic docu-
ments apart from informed consent. °9 For example, a website
could be programmed to keep a record of every instance that a
hyperlink containing required disclosures gets activated. 10 De-
livery would not be deemed complete, and the transaction
would not be concluded, until the recipient activates the appro-
priate hyperlink.31 ' Alternatively, the form that the passenger
uses to effectuate payment by entering credit card information
could be exclusively made accessible by way of a hyperlink con-
tained in the required liability notice. This would ensure that
the passenger has been exposed to the notice before concluding
federal securities laws and chooses to receive it electronically, that person should
be provided with a paper version of the document if any consent to receive docu-
ments electronically were revoked or the person specifically requests a paper
copy (regardless of whether any previously provided consent was revoked").
304 Id.
305 See April 2000 Release, supra note 262, at 71-73.
306 See id.
307 See id.
308 Id. at 73.
309 See October Interpretative Release, supra note 262, at 11.
310 See id. at 11, 15 ex. 15, 19-20 ex. 35.
31' See id. at 11.
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the transaction. 12 Postal mail or e-mail return receipts could
also be used to verify delivery.3 13
The SEC is not oblivious to the advantages of the Internet,
and fully acknowledges that the emergence of new technology
may well call for a departure from statutory literalism." 4 The
Internet allows for the rapid dissemination and publishing of
securities prospectuses "in a more cost-efficient, widespread,
and equitable manner than traditional paper-based methods." '315
The approach of the SEC has therefore been to encourage the
use of the Internet, by unequivocally stating that the notice and
delivery requirements under the securities laws may be satisfied
electronically, despite statutory silence on the matter.3"6 How-
ever, protections that preserve important rights must remain
firmly in place.
VI. THE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND
NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT
A. APPLICABILITY OF THE NEW LEGISLATION IN THE CONTEXT
OF ELECTRONIC TICKETING
The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act ("E-Sign Act"),317 the bulk of which took effect on October
1, 2000, makes electronic signatures and contracts as legally
binding as their pen and paper or printed matter
counterparts.- 8
The E-Sign Act helps to create "a uniform commercial legal
framework that recognizes, facilitates, and enforces electronic
transactions worldwide,"' 19 thereby responding to a public that
is "still wary of conducting extensive business over the Internet
3 2 See id. at 11, 20 exs. 31 & 33.
:3 See id. at 11.
, See October Interpretative Release, sup)ra note 262, at 2, 7.
315 [d. at 2.
,1i See id.
317 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No.
106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A.).
318 Jonathan E. Stern, The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 391, 397 (2001). See David M. Nadler &Valerie M.
Furman, Landmark Electronic Signatures Legislation Becomes Effective, ANDREws DERIV-
ATIvEs LITIG. REP., Feb. 26, 2001, at 11.
31,1 William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framewvork for Global Electronic Com-








In general, the E-Sign Act provides:
Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law..
with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or for-
eign commerce:
(1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such trans-
action may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforce-
ability solely because it is in electronic form; and
(2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied
legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an elec-
tronic signature or electronic record was used in its
formation.3 2 '
The consumer protections under the E-Sign Act are compara-
ble to those developed by the SEC in the absence of explicit
statutory guidance. In particular, the issue of consumer consent
is a keystone of the E-Sign Act. "1 2 2 Before a commercial transac-
tion may be conducted electronically, the consumer must have
affirmatively consented, and must not have withdrawn his con-
sent.3 23 Moreover, the consumer must be provided with a "clear
and conspicuous" statement advising him:
* of any right or option to have the record made available in
paper or non-electronic format;
* of the right to withdraw consent to conducting business in
electronic form, and of any conditions or consequences of
doing so (including any related fees);
* of the scope of the consent, that is, of the specific categories
of transactions that will be covered by the consumer's consent
over the course of the parties' relationship;
* of the procedures necessary to update or correct information
on the consumer's electronic records;
* of the procedures necessary to request particular documents
in paper format, and associated fees.142
Contrary to the SEC's position, however, under the E-Sign Act
doing business or entering into a given commercial transaction
may be conditioned upon obtaining the consumer's consent to
320 Id.
321 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(a) (2001).
322 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c) (2001). See atho Richard H. Rowe & Amybeth Garcia-
Bokor, The E-Sign Act and the Federal Securities Laws, INSIGHT, Dec. 2000, at 8.
323 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c) (2001).
324 Id.
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electronic delivery of documents. 25 Moreover, a consumer who
withholds his consent or requests paper documents may be pe-
nalized through the imposition of fees or higher CoSts. 3 26 In
other words, American Airlines' practice of charging a $10 dif-
ferential for shipping and handling to consumers who request
paper tickets instead of electronic tickets would be permissible
under the E-Sign Act, but would not be appropriate according
to SEC practice. 27
Under the E-Sign Act, a consumer must be "provided with a
statement of the hardware requirements for access to and reten-
tion of electronic records. '328 Moreover, the consumer must
confirm his request electronically, in a manner that confirms
that he has access to the electronic documents in the format in
which they will be transmitted .3 2" As discussed above, this stan-
dard is comparable to that required under the SEC's standards
for informed consent.
For example, Portfolio Document Format ("PDF") software,
developed by Adobe Systems, Inc., allows for the electronic
transmission of images that are virtual photocopies of the paper
document, and which the consumer can then use to print the
electronic document in paper form. 31' Transmission of an elec-
tronic ticket in PDF would be particularly desirable, because
PDF closely approximates a paper-based document, and could
be readily used to satisfy the "10-point modern type" and "con-
trasting stock" notice requirements of the 1966 MIA and the
DOT's implementing regulations.
Under the E-Sign Act, the air carrier would need to confirm
beforehand that the consumer has access to Adobe PDF Reader
software. As discussed above, according to the SEC only widely
accessible electronic formats (such as HTML, the standard In-
ternet computer language.) may generally be used in the ab-
325 See id.
32 See id.
327 See American Charges Fee for Paper Tickets, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 2001, at L4.
Other airlines are considering similar charges, which are also imposed by Alaska
Airlines. Id.
12 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c)(1)(C) (2001).
329 ld.
3'0 See Acrobat Welcome, at http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep.
html (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
331 "Hypertext Markup Language, or html, is a system of coding text files for dis-
play by World Wide Web browsers. By embedding certain special codes in the
document, the browser can be told how to display the text, what graphics to in-
clude, and what Internet services should be made available by hypertext links."
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sence of the recipient's specific consent. With respect to PDF,
however, a solution suggested by the SEC would involve, in the
case of electronic ticketing, giving the consumer the option of
downloading from the same website used to purchase the elec-
tronic ticket the software necessary to process documents in
PDF. Despite the absence of the passenger's specific consent,
this suggestion would satisfy the E-Sign Act equally well.
B. WHERE THE E-SIGN ACT FALLS SHORT
The E-Sign Act elevates an electronic document used for com-
mercial transactions to the status of the theoretical equivalent of
a paper contract. 32 However, it leaves a host of questions unset-
tled, including whether an electronic document constitutes an
original for evidentiary purposes; whether documents that must
be retained according to law can be retained in electronic form;
and whether electronic documents are admissible into evi-
dence. 33 3 The E-Sign Act does not address issues of contract for-
mation and sets no standards as to determining the parties'
intent or even the authenticity of electronic contracts or
signatures.334
The E-Sign Act is unspecific in character, and there is no gui-
dance as to whether it should apply to particular statutes or reg-
ulations.3 3 5 Although, as discussed above, the DOT has adopted
a laissez faire policy with respect to electronic ticketing, the im-
pact of the E-Sign Act on the regulations is not crystal clear. The
E-Sign Act will undoubtedly have significant repercussions on
the transportation industry as a whole, the regulation of which
has traditionally been document intensive. For example, the
Federal Maritime Commission has requested comments on the
impact of the E-Sign Act on those regulations governing mari-
time transportation that require the delivery of paper-based
documents. 336
Bennette Harris, HTML, available at http://www.wmsweb.com/websmart/html.
htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
332 See Drew M. Wintringham, Federal E-Sign Law Leaves Open Issues, N.Y.LJ.,




336 See The Impact of the Government Paperwork Elimination Act and the
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,468
(Apr. 22, 1997).
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With respect to aviation, courts will have to grapple with issues
such as whether an electronic ticket counts as a contract within
the meaning of the E-Sign Act, whether the E-Sign Act applies to
treaties, and in particular whether it applies to the Warsaw Con-
vention and related protocols. Whether the E-Sign Act applies to
the DOT tariff regulations, and especially to the regulations spe-
cifically enforcing the 1966 MIA, is also an open question. If a
court found that the E-Sign Act applies to both the Warsaw Con-
vention and the DOT regulations, it would also have to address
the issue of what constitutes the electronic format equivalent of
the 10-point modern type notice required by the 1966 MIA.
Despite the difficulties of interpretation that remain, the E-
Sign Act is a clear statement by the U.S. government of its will-
ingness to adapt existing law to emerging technologies. 37 Any
existing ambiguities should therefore be resolved in favor of giv-
ing substance to that primary intent.33 Accordingly, the fact
337 According to one contract law practitioner, "[The E-Signature Act] is not so
much a change-the-state-of-the-world law as it is a statement [that the government
approves of the paperless way of doing business]. It's a statement that lends confi-
dence to the business community. But there's still a lot that needs to be worked
out in real-world application before we'll see the real effect of the E-Signature
Act." Quoted in Mark Ballard, New Signature Act Ushers in Quite Revolution, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 21, 2000, at 5.
3-38 According to Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA), in a hearing on the proposed Elec-
tronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, before the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee of the Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives:
Mr. Chairman, the Internet is changing business - and the way
we do business. These companies are busy expanding the Internet
and E-commerce at an explosive pace. Last week, a University of
Texas study reported the Internet economy generated over $300
billion in U.S. revenue. In just five years since the commercial intro-
duction of the World Wide Web, the Internet sector rivals the auto-
mobile and the telecommunications industries in existence for
nearly a century.
As legislators we must amend outdated laws that impede this new
age of growth, while protecting important principals [sic] of fair-
ness. More importantly, as public policy makers we must be open to
new ways of thinking in order to create the conditions in which
innovation can flourish.
Everything - from the accounting standards that determine the
financial health of these companies, to how we educate our chil-
dren to participate in this new era of opportunity is subject to
review.
Silicon Valley owes its success to the principal [sic] that failure is
not bad. These industries have thrived because they know failure
can in the end signify progress. One cannot think outside of the
box without encountering failure. Now, can you think of a concept
any more foreign than that here in risk-adverse Washington?
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that the Warsaw Convention and related agreements, protocols,
and implementing statutes and regulations do not specifically
address the issue of electronic tickets should not dissuade courts
from treating them as the legal equivalents to paper tickets. This
approach is also consistent with that developed by the SEC in
the securities context, despite the absence of a statutory refor-
mulation of the U.S. security laws to explicitly take into account
the use of electronic documents.
VII. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE - THE MONTREAL
CONVENTION OF 1999
In May 28, 1999, 52 states gathered in Montreal to negotiate
and sign a new convention on air carrier liability, to be known as
the Montreal Convention of 1999."' The Montreal Convention
of 1999 replaces the Warsaw Convention's liability regime with a
two-tiered liability framework, the second tier of which provides
for unlimited recovery in the event of passenger death or injury,
as well as higher liability limits for baggage and cargo. 4  The
Mr. Chairman, that however is the challenge before us. As public
policy makers we must think outside of the box.
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act: Hearing on H.R. 1714 Before
theJ. Econ. Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Rep. Anna Eshoo). For the
views of the Clinton Administration, see Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act: Hearing on H.R. 1714 Before the Subconim. on Courts and Intellectual
Prop., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Ivan K. Fong, Deputy Assoc. Attorney
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice); Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act: Hearing on H.R. 1714 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop., 106th
Cong. (1999) (statement of Andrew .J. Pincus, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce).
.%) See Montreal Convention of 1999, supra note 132; see also A New Convention
for Air Carrier Liability, at http://www.phillipsfox.com.au/publications/Pnd99001.
htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2002). The following countries are the original signato-
ries of the Montreal Convention of 1999: Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize,
Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chile, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Gabon, Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Lithuania, Madagascar,
Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Paki-
stan, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, UK, USA, Zambia. Id.
340 See Montreal Convention, supra note 132, at arts. 21, 22. Specifically, Article
21 of the Montreal Convention of 1999, entitled "Compensation in case of death
or injury of passengers," provides:
1. For damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 not ex-
ceeding 100 000 Special Drawing Rights for each passenger,
the carrier shall not be able to exclude or limit its liability.
2. The carrier shall not be liable for damages arising under para-
graph 1 of Article 17 to the extent that they exceed for each
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Montreal Convention in the first tier provides for absolute liabil-
ity of up to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights, or approximately
$140,000, in damages. 4' To defend against (unlimited) recov-
eries beyond that amount, the airline must show that it took all
necessary measures to avoid damages or that it was impossible to
take such measures, a burden which according to a very promi-
nent aviation attorney is "almost impossible to meet in all
cases."342 Nonetheless, a carrier will be liable, without limit, for
all of the plaintiffs provable damages, should it fail to meet that
burden. 34 _
Significantly, however, the Montreal Convention does not al-
low for punitive damages. The Convention expressly provides
that "punitive, exemplary or any other non-compensatory dam-
ages shall not be recoverable.3 44 Moreover, the Montreal Con-
vention requires that any cause of action, however founded, can
only be brought under the terms, conditions, and limitations
that it specifically sets forth. 45 In other words, if the Montreal
Convention applies, U.S. law cannot apply. Accordingly, because
punitive damages are an integral part of the U.S. tort system,3 46
and because the Montreal Convention does not allow them, ap-
plication of the Convention may serve to impair plaintiffs'
rights.
passenger 100 000 Special Drawing Rights if the carrier proves
that:
(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other
wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or
agents; or
(b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other
wrongful act or omission of a third party.
Id. at art. 21.
341 Id.; see also Lee S. Kreindler, Millennium Revolution, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 30, 1999,
at 3.
342 Kreindler, supra note 341; see also Montreal Convention, supra note 132, at
art. 21 (2).
'43 See Montreal Convention, supra note 132, at art. 21(2).
344 [(.
345 See id.
346 See generally Russell Jackson Drake, Symposium on Tort Reform: IV. Punitive
Damages: Where We Stand, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 441 (1993/1994); W. Lee Pittman &
Bert S. Nettles, Symposium on Tort Reform: V. Debate: What Is the Role or Function of
Punitive Damages?, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 453 (1993/1994); Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Conference on "Tort Reform": The Predict-
ability of Punitive Damages, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997).
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An advantage of the Montreal Convention is that it signifi-
cantly simplifies the contents of passenger documentation.3 47 A
passenger ticket must be delivered, but this document must only
contain a limited number of items, namely the places of depar-
ture and destination, as well as one stopping place, if the jour-
ney involves one or more stopping places. 4 However, no
penalty attaches for a failure to supply this information. 4 '
The Montreal Convention specifically allows for this limited
information to be transmitted by way of non-paper-based ticket-
ing. In other words, carriers may use electronic ticketing and
electronic air waybills without being sanctioned for having failed
to deliver a paper-based ticket or air waybill. 5 " According to Ar-
ticle 3(2) of the Montreal Convention, "Any other means which
preserves the information indicated in paragraph 1 may be sub-
stituted for the delivery of the document referred to in that par-
agraph. If any such other means is used, the carrier shall offer to
deliver to the passenger a written statement of the information
so preserved. ' 351
Like the Warsaw Convention, the Montreal Convention re-
quires that passengers be warned about any potential liability
limits. Specifically, Article 3(4) provides that "The passenger
shall be given written notice to the effect that where this Con-
vention is applicable it governs and may limit the liability of car-
riers in respect of death or injury and for destruction or loss of,
or damage to, baggage, and for delay. '352 Unlike Article 3(2) of
the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, however, Arti-
cle 3(4) of the Montreal Convention of 1999 does not provide
for sanctions in the event of nondelivery of this required notice.
Another interpretative difficulty has to do with form of deliv-
ery. It is not clear whether the "written notice" specified by Arti-
cle 3(4) may be delivered electronically, pursuant to Article 3(2)
of the Montreal Convention. Article 3(2) makes specific refer-
ence to Article 3(1), but does not mention Article 3(4). That
fact, along with the specific use of the term "written notice" in
Article 3(4), strongly suggests that the drafters of the Montreal
347 See Thomas J. Whalen, The 1999 Montreal Convention, at http://www.for-
warderlaw.com/feature/condomtl.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
348 See Montreal Convention, supra note 132, at art. 3(1).
349 See Thomas J. Whalen, supra note 347.
350 See id.
351 Montreal Convention, supra note 132, at art. 3(2).
352 Id. at art. 3(4).
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Convention intended that this notice be delivered in a tradi-
tional, paper-based, printed format.
Of course, the efficiencies of electronic ticketing would be se-
verely impaired if, while allowing electronic tickets, a require-
ment were to be imposed making it necessary for some paper
document to be delivered in all instances. However, Article 3(4)
of the Montreal Convention, unlike Article 3(2) of the Warsaw
Convention, does not require that any document be "delivered"
by the carrier.:1 Instead, the operative term used is "given." Per-
haps this "written notice" can be "given" at the gate, printed on
the back of a boarding pass. As discussed above, courts following
the legal reasoning developed in the Flying Tiger Line cases
(which have not been overruled, despite Chan) would find this
unacceptable in the context of the Warsaw Convention, particu-
larly in the case of last-minute-arrival passengers. This practice,
however, may well be acceptable in the context of the Montreal
Convention, especially in view of the relatively expansive liability
that it allows.
DOT regulations aside, today there may not even be a need
for notice. Formal notice was important when carriers could
readily invoke discernible limits on liability. In the eve of the
Montreal Convention of 1999, however, there are no limits of
liability. Moreover, the first tier of the two-tier liability system,
which now prevails for international transportation, seems more
generous to passengers than the system, which prevails in U.S.
domestic air transportation, because it guarantees recovery up
to a certain amount. Because the latter system does not call for
notice of any type, it may be that, in the U.S. at least, there is
simply no need for notice. Alternatively, the notice may simply
state that the Warsaw Convention is applicable and precludes
punitive damages, if otherwise available.
The European Council recently endorsed the Montreal Con-
vention of 1999, urging that EU member states ratify the treaty
so that it comes into effect simultaneously, on a continent-wide
basis, and no later than Dec. 31, 2002.54 Moreover, the Euro-
pean Commission has proposed regulation to immediately im-
plement key aspects of the Montreal Convention. 5 In the U.S.,
the Executive Branch transmitted the Convention to the Senate
3 5 3 Id.; Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3(2).
354 See European Council Urges Speedy Ratification of Montreal Convention, WORLD




on Sept. 6, 2000, recommending advice and consent.3 56 How-
ever, the Senate has not yet acted.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The world of aviation has changed dramatically since the
drafting of the Warsaw Convention. Despite the forward-looking
mindset of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention, they could
not have anticipated the conditions that today prevail in the air-
line industry. In 1929, "the only international flight was between
Key West, Florida, and Havana, Cuba. '3 57 In 1999, 57.3 million
passengers traveled internationally, while 583.7 million passen-
gers did so domestically, by aircraft arriving or departing from
the 18,345 airports of all sizes and descriptions in the U.S. 358
Financially, the industry is today very strong, with hundreds of
billions of dollars in yearly revenues and tens of billions of dol-
lars in net income.359
Moreover, the industry today has a most impressive safety re-
cord. The frequency of fatal accidents in commercial airlines is
one per 1.4 billion miles flown, compared to one per 140 mil-
lion miles flown as recently as 1970.360 In fact, it is now much
safer to travel by air than by road.36' The lifetime odds of dying
in an aviation accident for a U.S. resident are one in 3,286, com-
pared with one in 80 for a motor vehicle accident.36 2 The risk of
being involved in an aviation accident where there are multiple
fatalities is 1 in 3 million. 63' By contrast, road transportation ac-
356 See William J. Clinton, Message from the President of the United States Transmit-
ting The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rulesfor International Carriage by Air,
Done at Montreal, May 28, 1999, available at http://www.cargolaw.com/presenta-
tions montrealcli.html (last visited April 16, 2002).
357 David Cohen, Montreal Protocol: The Most Recent Attempt to Modify the Warsaw
Convention, 8J. AIR L. & COM. 146, 150 (1983).
358 BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS AN-
NUAL REPORT 1999, available at www.bts.gov (last visitied Aug. 30, 2002); BUREAU
OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, OFFICE OF AIRLINE INFORMATION, AIR STATISTICS
AND AIRLINE FINANCIAL STATISTICS, available at www.bts.gov/oai/indicators/
top.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
359 See BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, OFFICE OF AIRLINE INFORMA-
TION, AIR STATISTICS AND AIRLINE FINANCIAL STATISTICS, available at http://
www.bts.gov/oai/indicators/yrlyopfinani.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
360 See Air Flight Much Safer than Road Travel, Statistics Show, supra note 7. By
comparison, the frequency of fatal air accidents was one per 1,000 miles flown in
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cidents kill about 400,000 people every year worldwide, with a
further 12,000,000 injured. 164
The Warsaw Convention was drafted with a view towards the
conditions confronting the aviation industry at the time. How-
ever, the delegates at the original Convention did not intend to
adopt a document that would remain frozen in time. Instead,
the delegates fully recognized their inability to draft a document
that could anticipate and address every single technological de-
velopment in the field of aviation, rapidly changing even then.
According to Mr. Henri de Vos:
I am well aware that there exists no definitive convention - I
should say fortunately! ... Therefore, we should consider that in
air navigation, it is necessary to begin by laying down the pri-
mary general rules of the problem; we make the first effort and
we must be happy to do so. If there are improvements to be
brought forth, life does not end today, we can do them later
on. 3
65
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Chan v. Korean Air Lines
sets forth a restrictive interpretation of the "passenger" guaran-
tees available under Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention. By
decoupling Article 3(1) from the punitive Article 3(2), Justice
Scalia would lessen the negative impact on a carrier from a fail-
ure to abide by the terms of Article 3(1). On the other hand,
Justice Scalia's literal reading of the Warsaw Convention may
prove troublesome for air carriers that deliver tickets electroni-
cally, because the language of the Convention makes no allow-
ance for such a method of effecting passenger ticket delivery. As
discussed above, however, the U.S. ratification of the Hague Pro-
tocol, which redrafts Articles 3(1) and 3(2) to explicitly link
them, renders largely irrelevant the main thrust of Justice
Scalia's analysis in Chan. Justice Scalia's well-known penchant
for literalism in statutory and treaty interpretation, however,
remains."","
Like Justice Scalia's majority opinion, Justice Brennan's con-
curring opinion in Chan v. Korean Air Lines is a double-edged
sword for electronic ticketing. Justice Brennan's willingness to
.1 See id.
-135 Minutes, supra note 8, at 32.
1166 See generally Karin P. Sheldon, "It's not my job to care": Understanding Justice
Scalia's Method of Statutory Interpretation Through Sweet Home and Chevron, 24 B.C.
ENV'H... AFF. L. REV. 487 (1997); Arthur Stock, note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in




examine the drafting history of the Warsaw Convention bodes
well for electronic ticketing. On the other hand, Justice Bren-
nan emphasizes the passenger-protection role of the Warsaw
Convention's notice requirements. Justice Brennan's concur-
ring opinion relies on legal standards comparable to those de-
veloped by the courts in the Flying Tiger Line and Lisi cases. In
particular, Justice Brennan emphasizes that notice must be
meaningful, in the sense that it must allow the passenger an op-
portunity to take remedial action, such as purchasing additional
insurance, to protect himself and his family against the Conven-
tion's liability limits in the event of an air disaster.
Regarding type size, the only bright lines available from previ-
ous case law is that type size must be larger than 4-point type,
but may be as small as 8 points. In the context of electronic
tickets, unless the carrier is deliberately attempting to obscure
the notice, this particular issue should not be so significant, be-
cause, unlike paper-based tickets, electronic tickets are not con-
strained space-wise (although they may well be constrained
memory-wise). Through hyperlinks and other methods of con-
necting Internet screens, electronic tickets should be able to
provide notice in any type size with equivalent convenience to
the carrier. If PDF is used to deliver the electronic tickets, type
size may well be a significant consideration from the carrier's
point of view. Nonetheless, as a general rule, the carrier should
always strive to use type size of 10 points or above in electronic
notices of any format.
Before a carrier may satisfy the notice requirements of the
Warsaw Convention by way of electronic delivery, it needs to se-
cure the passenger's consent. This may be done by use of a dia-
log box that asks the passenger whether he consents to
electronic delivery of his ticket, including all associated docu-
mentation. Purchase of the electronic ticket may then be con-
firmed by an e-mail hyper linked to a notice of the Warsaw
Convention's liability limits in the carrier's website. Alterna-
tively, the notice could be contained in the scroll-down portion
of the confirmation document, easily accessible by way of an in-
ternal hyperlink. Whatever the case, the hyperlink should be
prominently displayed to encourage the passenger to activate it.
With minimal safeguards and common sense, a carrier should
be able to satisfy the notice and delivery requirements of the
Warsaw Convention in the Electronic Age, even absent a formal
amendment to the treaty. This should become an even easier
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process when and if the U.S. ratifies the Montreal Convention of
1999 and it enters into force.
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